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Introduction 
Thesis statement 
Despite the exalted status of Southern Song 南宋 (1127–1279) scholar Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–
1200) within contemporary scholarship, relatively little effort has been made to understand his 
views on military affairs and policy, notwithstanding the repeated claim that the topic bore 
particular significance to Zhu and exerted a profound influence on his worldview.
1
 Born after 
the dramatic fall of the northern court at the hands of the Jurchen Jin 金 (1115–1234) and its 
subsequent relocation to the south in 1127, Zhu Xi’s lifetime was marked by a continuing 
stand-off between the two states. Save for several violent interruptions, most notably 
following a Jurchen invasion in 1161, the situation remained largely stable throughout his life. 
However, Zhu viewed this period of coexistence as a reflection of his dynasty’s weakness and 
considered the military recovery of the “Central Plains” (Zhongyuan 中原 ) a moral 
imperative.
2
 
Accordingly, the topic of warfare permeated his work, featuring not only in those 
writings directly concerned with practical issues of contemporaneous political relevance, but 
also in his more theoretical and foundational works. Among the former selection of writings, 
one may count a sizeable collection of monographs, court memorials, and letters exchanged 
between Zhu Xi and influential figures at court, as well as with his colleagues within the 
intellectual community of the “Learning of the Way” (Daoxue 道學 ), with whom Zhu 
discussed the strategic intricacies of the Jin-Song conflict.
3
 Arguably most representative of 
the second selection of writings, namely those works with a primarily theoretical or 
philosophical orientation, were Zhu Xi’s commentaries on the Four Books (Sishu 四書) and 
the frequent discussions on their topics with his disciples, as recorded in the Thematic 
Discourses of Master Zhu (Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類).4 As the current thesis will contend, Zhu 
                                                            
1 See for example Daniel K. Gardner, Chu Hsi: Learning to Be a Sage (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1999), 7–11, and Brian McKnight, “Chu Hsi and His World,” in Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism, ed. Wing-tsit 
Chan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986), 408–9. 
2 This point is most famously made in 1162, when Zhu presented his first official memorial to the throne of 
Emperor Xiaozong 宋孝宗 (r. 1162–1189). See Zhu Xi 朱熹, Hui’an xiansheng zhuwengong wenji 晦庵先生朱
文公文集 , incorporated in Zhuzi quanshu 朱子全書 , ed. Zhu Jieren 朱傑人 , volumes 20–25 (Shanghai: 
Shanghai guji chubanshe, 2002), 11.569–80. Hereafter respectively WJ and ZZQS. 
3 For the position of Daoxue within the strategic debate, see Zhang Weiling, “Cong Nansong zhongqi fanjinxi 
zhengzheng kan daoxuexing shidafu dui huifu taidu de zhuanbian 從南宋中期反近習政爭看道學型士大夫對
“恢復”態度的轉變” (MA Diss., National Taiwan University, 2009). 
4 Zhu Xi 朱熹, Zhuzi yulei 朱子語類, ed. Li Jingde 黎靖德 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986). Hereafter ZZYL. 
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Xi’s approach to the topic of warfare throughout this body of work demonstrates a striking 
degree of thematic, philosophical, and perspectival unity. The aim of the present thesis is to 
map this strand of military thought, seeking to answer the following research question:  
 
How have Zhu Xi’s views on warfare informed and found reflection in his recorded 
work? 
 
Despite the distinct importance of military issues within Zhu Xi’s life and thought, much of 
the present-day debate has taken place at the margins of the discourse. Three interrelated 
issues characterize the limitations of recent scholarship.  
Firstly, recent approaches have been limited virtually exclusively to Zhu Xi’s political 
writings on the contemporaneous Jin-Song conflict, with little regard for war as it featured in 
his more foundational or philosophical works. Arguably most important among this latter 
sphere of discourse is Zhu’s commentary on the Four Books, collected into the Collected 
Commentaries on Chapters and Phrases of the Four Books (Sishu zhangju jizhu 四書章句集
註).5 Between 1163 and 1190, concurrent with the span of his activities as an anti-peace 
advocate, Zhu Xi authored commentaries on the Lunyu 論語, Mengzi 孟子, Daxue 大學, and 
Zhongyong 中庸.6 Presented by Zhu Xi as the primary gateway through which the Confucian 
scholar may reach an understanding of metaphysical Principle (li 理), the universal pattern 
underlying and normatively determining the proper course of all things “as they should be” 所
當然, the contents of the Four Books reflected the foundation for most, if not all, of his 
thought.
7
 Emphasizing throughout his commentaries the foundational importance of Principle 
to his theory of government and all its legitimate activities, he indicated that military policy 
was not exempt from its normative strictures.
8
 Accordingly, I will devote chapters 1 to 3 to 
these foundational commentaries. 
Secondly, recent assessments of Zhu Xi’s views on warfare, confined to the topic of 
the strategic debate at the Song court, have remained narrow in scope. They have tended to 
concentrate singularly on one of three chief issues, focusing on Zhu Xi’s moral case for war 
                                                            
5 Zhu Xi 朱熹, Sishu zhangju jizhu 四書章句集註 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983). Hereafter SSZJJZ. 
6 Conventionally translated as the Analects, Mencius, Great Learning, and Doctrine of the Mean. See Daniel K. 
Gardner, “Principle and Pedagogy: Chu Hsi and the Four Books,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 44:1 
(1984): 57–9. 
7 WJ, 57.2736. For the self-professed importance of the Four Books, see WJ, 59.2811; ZZYL, 14.249. 
8 See for example SSZJJZ, 134–5, 154–5. 
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against the Jurchen,
9
 his support for either an aggressive or defensive grand strategy,
10
 or his 
proposals for military and political reform.
11
 As these have hitherto been discussed mostly as 
separate issues, several important points of interaction and interdependence between these 
topics within Zhu Xi’s broader thought on the conflict have gone unnoticed. As I will 
demonstrate more closely in chapters 4 to 6, besides serving to nuance our understanding of 
each issue individually, these focal points of interaction simultaneously indicate a 
substantially more coherent strand of military thought than has previously been suggested. 
Thirdly, previous attempts at relating Zhu Xi’s statements on these and related issues 
to broader processes of historical development, particularly with regards to Zhu’s personal 
intellectual development as well as historical and political circumstances throughout his life, 
have suffered from the use of a relatively narrow range of sources. The present thesis will 
consult a broader range of public memorials, private letters, and individually authored 
monographs than previous assessments have taken into account. By doing so, I seek to 
provide alternative interpretations for many key statements uttered by Zhu Xi throughout his 
political and commentatorial activities. 
At this point it bears emphasizing that, considering the mostly concurrent historical 
development of Zhu Xi’s “theoretical” and “practical” spheres of writing, it is difficult if not 
impossible to identify a clear unidirectional flow of influence between them. On the contrary, 
as I will argue throughout the subsequent chapters, several important points of similarity 
between the spheres suggest the possibility of a complex and multidirectional relationship. 
These observations underline the necessity for a thoroughly historicized approach, aimed not 
only at relating Zhu Xi’s arguments to their proper historical context, but also at facilitating 
the identification of parallels and possible loci of interaction. More fundamentally, they 
suggest one may attribute to Zhu Xi a coherent strand of military thought, formed over several 
                                                            
9 Qian Mu 錢穆, Zhuzi xinxue’an 朱子新學案, 5 volumes (Taipei: Sanmin shuju, 1971), 5:77–9; Li Longxian 李
隆獻, Fuchouguan de xingcha yu quanshi 復仇觀的省察與詮釋 (Taipei: Taida chuban, 2015); Hoyt Tillman, 
Utilitarian Confucianism: Ch’en Liang’s Challenge to Chu Hsi (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), 
169–76. 
10 Zhu Ruixi 朱瑞熙, “Zhu Xi shi touxiangpai, maiguozei ma? 朱熹是投降派、賣國賊嗎?” Lishi yanjiu 9 
(1978): 72–7; Zhang Weiling, “Huifu taidu”; Tillman, Utilitarian Confucianism, 170–9; Yu Yingshi 余英時, 
Zhu Xi de lishi shijie 朱熹的歷史世界 (Beijing: Sanlian chubanshe, 2004), 272–88; Zhou Chaxian 周茶仙, 
“Zhu Xi junshi sixiang shulun 朱熹軍事思想述論,” Zhuzi xuekan 13 (1999): 322–34. 
11 Jiang Guozhu 姜國柱, “Zhu Xi de junshi sixiang 朱熹的軍事思想,” Zhuzi xuekan 17 (2003): 134–5; Zhou, 
“Junshi sixiang,” 323–5; Niu Pu, “Confucian Statecraft in Song China: Ye Shi and the Yongjia School” (PhD. 
Diss., Arizona State University, 1998); Tillman, Utilitarian Confucianism, 178–9. 
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decades through the influence of his concurrent and interrelated experiences as both an 
influential philosophical thinker and an active participant in the political debate. 
 
Sources and methodology 
The present thesis is divided into two main parts, each focusing on a particular set of sources. 
Because of the reasons outlined above, this is a distinction in focus only; considerable overlap 
must and will occur.  
 The first part of the thesis, focusing on Zhu Xi’s theoretical and speculative 
approaches to warfare, will revolve around a close reading of the Four Books and his 
interlinear commentary.
12
 Relevant passages are identified on the basis of keywords.
13
 
Additionally, I shall refer extensively to the record of conversations Zhu Xi had with his 
disciples throughout the last decades of his life, collected in the Zhuzi yulei.
14
 
In the second part of the thesis, focusing on Zhu Xi’s writings on the contemporaneous 
Jin-Song conflict, I shall widen my scope to include a considerably greater collection of 
sources, virtually all of which are arranged in the Collected Works of Mister Hui’an, Zhu 
Wengong (Hui’an xiansheng zhuwengong wenji 晦庵先生朱文公文集).15 Most importantly, 
these include Zhu Xi’s official court memorials (fengshi 封事 and zouzha 奏劄), personal 
letters (shu 書), prefaces (xu 序), biographies (xingzhuang 行狀) and stele inscriptions (bei
碑).16 Additionally, I will consult two thematic arrangements found in juan 110 and 133 of the 
Zhuzi yulei, entitled respectively “On Warfare” (Lun bing 論兵) and “Barbarians” (Yidi 夷
狄).17 
                                                            
12 I base myself on the 1983 Zhonghua shuju 中華書局 edition of the Sishu zhangju jizhu 四書章句集註. The 
basis for this edition is a copy of a woodblock print dated to 1242. 
13 These include bianfang 邊防 “border defense”, bing 兵 “soldiers; armaments”, di 敵 “enemy”, fa 伐 “armed 
expedition”, jun 軍 “army; military district”, lu 虜 “caitiff”, rong 戎 “weapons; military affairs”, tao 討 “to 
suppress”, tuntian 屯田  “agro-colonies”, yidi 夷狄  “barbarian”, zhan 戰  “war; battle”, and zheng 征  “to 
conscript; punitive campaign”. 
14 For the dating of these conversations, I rely on the indications included in the introduction to the 1986 edition 
of the Yulei, complemented with the work of Tanaka Kenji 田中謙二, “Shumon deshi shiji nenkō 朱門弟子師事
年攷,” Toho gakuho 東方學報 44 (1973): 147‒218. 
15 This collection is incorporated into the Zhuzi quanshu, spanning volumes 20 through 25. The basis for this 
reproduction is a woodblock edition originally carved in 1265. 
16 For the dating of these writings, I rely primarily on Wang Maohong 王懋竑, Zhu Xi nianpu 朱熹年譜, 
annotated by He Zhongli 何忠禮 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1998), hereafter ZXNP; complemented with Chen 
Lai 陳來, Zhuzi shuxin biannian kaozheng 朱子書信編年考證 (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2007). 
17 ZZYL, 110.2705–12, 133.3185–201. 
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My approach to these sources is to contextualize them in three important ways. Firstly, 
I aim to locate these findings within their respective strands of philosophical and political 
argumentation, relating them to the broader conceptual frameworks that constituted Zhu Xi’s 
thought. Secondly, having identified these strands, I will continue to historicize them by 
examining how processes of internal continuity and change informed their development 
throughout Zhu Xi’s commentatorial and political activities. Thirdly, relating these processes 
to the changing historical, political, and social circumstances that marked Zhu Xi’s lifetime, I 
aim to reconstruct the motivations shaping these developments. 
 
Thesis structure 
The reasons to divide the current thesis into two main parts are twofold. Firstly, Zhu Xi’s 
views on military affairs as they feature in his classical commentaries have not yet been 
subjected to any attempt at systematic analysis. In order to both achieve the necessary depth 
of analysis and provide it with the platform it has hitherto been denied, I shall dedicate the 
first three chapters primarily to this sphere of discourse. 
Secondly, the division reflects a significantly more fundamental characteristic of Zhu 
Xi’s thought. Within the cosmological framework that emerged throughout his commentaries, 
transcendental Principle, as the universal pattern normatively determining the course of all 
things, theoretically preceded the latter. Put simply, Principle gave shape to events, not the 
other way around. Assuming that Zhu Xi indeed believed this doctrine to be applicable to 
real-world politics, it appears consistent with his own theoretical framework to discuss his 
philosophical views prior to the reassessment of his more practically-oriented writings. As I 
will demonstrate in subsequent chapters, the latter sphere of writing indeed reflects several 
key features of the frameworks put forth in Zhu’s classical commentaries.  
As I noted previously, this approach runs the serious risk of anachronistically 
attributing to Zhu’s applied political writings of the 1160s and 1170s a philosophical 
framework that he did not in fact fully commit to writing until the late 1180s, marked by the 
formalization of his commentaries on the Daxue and Zhongyong. By carefully placing each 
statement in its proper historical and intellectual context, I aim to mitigate this risk. 
Simultaneously, by focusing first on the most explicit articulations of Zhu Xi’s philosophical 
framework, those exhibited in his classical commentaries, I aim to facilitate the subsequent 
identification of partly implicit reflections of and precursors to these strands of thought within 
those writings aimed chiefly at concrete issues of contemporaneous political relevance. 
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The aim of chapter 1 is to establish the importance of the topic of warfare within Zhu 
Xi’s interpretation of the Four Books and to identify the main perspectives through which he 
addressed the topic. Of particular interest is the relation Zhu envisioned between proper 
governmental practice, ideally founded on the apprehension of Principle, and the formulation 
of military policy. In chapter 2 I shall discuss the notion of the punitive expedition, the only 
morally acceptable form of aggressive warfare within this military paradigm. Focusing on the 
tension between moral virtue and military strength that informed Zhu Xi’s conceptualization 
of this type of warfare, I will discuss its implications for Zhu’s views on political legitimacy 
and Chinese-barbarian relations. The aim of chapter 3 is to depart momentarily from these 
political and strategic approaches to warfare and turn instead to its implications for Zhu Xi’s 
theory on individual morality and historical legitimacy. I will argue that Zhu Xi’s moral 
framework eventually allowed for a decidedly positive approach to warfare, framing it as a 
morally legitimate and functionally indispensable implement of government, worthy of 
practically-oriented concern. 
Chapter 4 marks my turn to those writings concerned chiefly with issues of concrete 
contemporaneous interest, focusing on his case for an eventual offensive against the Jurchen 
Jin. Challenging the recent claim that Zhu supposedly abandoned the revanchist cause in his 
later years, I will examine several conceptual shifts that enabled him to maintain this case for 
war with unabated fervor. In chapter 5 I will reassess Zhu Xi’s position within the strategic 
debate. Revisiting the commonly held assumption that Zhu “hawkishly” advocated war during 
the early 1160s, I will instead argue that his demonstrable awareness of perceived Song 
military weakness as early as 1161 determined his consistently defensive and preparatory 
attitude, suggesting distinct conceptual parallels with the theoretical framework outlined in 
part 1. Building further on this conceptual scaffolding in chapter 6, I will reassess Zhu Xi’s 
concrete policy recommendations. I will argue that, reflecting the dynamic between moral 
cultivation and concrete governmental practices emphasized in his classical commentaries, his 
approach to warfare remained sensitive to the demands of historical, social, and strategic 
circumstances. Throughout, I will reflect on several substantial implications of this argument 
for our understanding of Zhu Xi’s broader political philosophy, his thought on individual 
morality, and his participation within Song political debate. 
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1. The Classics and Warfare 
The aim of this chapter is to identify the status of warfare as a topic within Zhu Xi’s 
interpretation of the Four Books and to uncover the perspectives through which he addressed 
it. In the first section I address Zhu Xi’s attitude toward warfare as a concept in the abstract 
and, more concretely, as a topic of scholarly inquiry. Contrasting his comments with those of 
his scholarly predecessors and the supposed tradition of “Confucian pacifism” described in 
recent scholarship, I argue that Zhu placed a distinct importance on practical knowledge of 
military affairs. In the second section I determine the precise status of material and 
preparatory military policy within Zhu Xi’s broader framework of legitimate government 
activity. Based on a discussion of the distinction between the “root” (ben 本) and the “tip” 
(mo 末 ) of government, famously introduced in the Great Learning, I argue that Zhu 
eventually came to see concrete military preparations as an essential aspect of proper 
government. In the third section I extend this discussion to the act of war itself, examining the 
specific standards used to qualify legitimate warfare. 
 
1.1 Initial approaches: military knowledge 
The portrayal of Zhu Xi as a life-long advocate of war against the Jurchen Jin, noted in the 
introduction, stands in stark contrast with the notion of “Confucian pacifism”, a recurrent 
theme throughout modern scholarship on the topic of warfare within classical Confucian 
literature. One of the earliest descriptions of this notion can be found in the work of Lei 
Haizong, who unambiguously condemned this tradition as a “culture without soldiers”.18 A 
similar reiteration of this view has been expressed by John Fairbank, who has claimed that the 
Confucian scholarly tradition functioned to privilege civil (wen 文) over military (wu 武) 
topics of knowledge and regarded a recourse to violent conflict as a sign of moral 
bankruptcy.
19
 It is in this vein that Wang Yuankang, in his work on imperial Chinese strategic 
culture, has pointed specifically to Zhu Xi’s commentatorial work as a direct cause of a 
supposed “growing trend of pacifism and aversion to war” during the Southern Song.20 
                                                            
18 Lei Haizong 雷海宗, Zhongguo wenhua yu zhongguo de bing 中國文化與中國的兵 (Beijing: Shangwu 
yinshuguan, [1939]2001), 102. 
19 Frank A. Kiernan and John K. Fairbank, Chinese Ways in Warfare (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1974), 7–9. 
20 Wang Yuankuang, Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), 79. 
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One of the textual passages most widely cited as an example of the supposed pacifist 
component within the Confucian canon is Analects 15:1, which narrates how Duke Ling of 
Wei 衛靈公 questioned Confucius on the topic of troop formations. Apparently dissatisfied 
with this particular line of inquiry, Confucius responded: “I have heard of matters pertaining 
to sacrificial vessels; I have not learned about military affairs.” 俎豆之事，則嘗聞之矣；軍
旅之事，未之學也.21 Confucius is supposed to have left Wei the very next day, allegedly 
confirming his distaste with all military topics.
22
 In his interlinear commentary to this passage, 
Zhu Xi instead suggested a different interpretation, arguing that while Confucius did not 
object to the topic of warfare in general, he was reluctant to discuss it with rulers he 
considered immoral: “Duke Ling of Wei was a ruler who lacked the Way and, furthermore, 
had military aspirations. Therefore, he responded by saying he had not learned about it and 
left [Wei].” 衛靈公，無道之君也，復有志於戰伐之事，故答以未學而去之.23 As the 
wording of Zhu’s comment suggests, it was not the topic of warfare in general but rather its 
combination with the supposed immorality of the Duke that was the reason for Confucius’ 
disapproval.  
Zhu himself seems to have had no distaste for military knowledge, and it is unlikely he 
indeed believed Confucius was ignorant on the topic. The biography of Confucius included in 
the Records of the Historian (Shiji 史記), which Zhu himself assigned a certain degree of 
credibility and cited extensively in his own introduction to the Analects,
24
 in fact records that 
the disciple Ran You 冉有  had obtained his apparently outstanding military skill from 
Confucius himself.
25
 While one might doubt the truthfulness of these particular records, Zhu 
Xi himself indeed possessed considerable knowledge of the more technical aspects of military 
affairs. Speaking to his disciples about the necessity of such practical knowledge for a proper 
investigation of Principle, Zhu stated: “[Scholars] nowadays do not understand the methods of 
troop formation, so whenever they discuss the military their discussions come to nothing.” 今
人不曾理會陣法，則談兵亦皆是脫空.26 Demonstrating his own knowledge on the subject, 
Zhu Xi discussed on several occasions the treatise on troop formations entitled Explanation of 
                                                            
21 SSZJJZ, 161. 
22  This interpretation is provided in Yao Xinzhong, “Conflict, Peace, and Ethical Solutions: A Confucian 
Perspective on War,” Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies 4:2 (2004): 102; and Hu Shaohua, “Revisiting 
Chinese Pacifism,” Asian Affairs: An American Review 32:4 (2006): 259. 
23 SSZJJZ, 161. 
24 SSZJJZ, 41–3. 
25 Sima Qian 司馬遷, Shiji 史記, 10 volumes (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1963), 47.1934. 
26 ZZYL, 66.1635. 
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the Eight Front Diagram (Bazhen tushuo 八陣圖說), authored by his disciple Cai Yuanding 
蔡元定. Engaging its contents in detail, he criticized the allegedly ignorant tacticians of his 
time and offered several suggestions regarding their particular faults.
27
 
Furthermore, while Zhu occasionally expressed severe criticism of the classical 
thinkers traditionally associated with the “school of the military” (bingjia 兵家), as I will 
discuss more closely in the third section, he simultaneously demonstrated a close familiarity 
with their works and referred to them on several issues. One such issue was the perceived 
bloat and inertness that supposedly characterized the Song military, which he illustrated to his 
disciples in 1188 by citing the principle of “creating change by dividing and concentrating 
[troops]” 分合為變 from Master Sun’s Art of Warfare (Sunzi bingfa 孫子兵法).28 The Song 
armies of his own time, one is led to believe, were no longer capable of practicing this 
fundamental technique. Claims that Zhu had reportedly discussed this principle with famed 
Song general Zhang Jun 張浚 (1097‒1164) himself several decades prior, suggest that Zhu Xi 
did not shy away from questions of concrete military strategy.
29
 Other than on technical 
matters, Zhu furthermore cited phrases from these works to illustrate a diverse range of issues 
found within the Confucian classics.
30
 
That Zhu used examples of warfare to illustrate otherwise unrelated matters, does not 
mean he took the topic lightly. In Analects section 7:12, Confucius is described as exercising 
great caution in reference to the three topics of “fasting, war, and sickness” 子之所慎：齊，
戰，疾.31 Some have suggested such hesitation could imply his disapproval of these topics 
and even indicate a supposed war-averse component within the Confucian tradition.
32
 Zhu Xi, 
on the contrary, pointed out that caution (shen 慎) suggested not disapproval but rather an 
affirmation of the gravity of the issue, implying that the possibly far-reaching consequences 
of warfare required careful attention. Echoing a strikingly similar dictum from the Art of War, 
Zhu commented: “War intertwines the fate of the people and the survival of the state.” 戰則
                                                            
27 ZZYL, 132.3166, 136.3238–40. 
28 ZZYL, 110.2708. See Yang Bing’an 楊丙安, ed., Shiyi jia zhu Sunzi jiaoli 十一家註孫子校理 (Beijing: 
Zhonghua shuju, 1999), 142. Hereafter Sunzi. 
29 ZZYL, 110.2705–6. 
30 See for example ZZYL, 52.1262, 75.1920, 125.2996–7. 
31 SSZJJZ, 96. 
32 James A. Stroble, “Justification of War in Ancient China,” Asian Philosophy 8:3 (1998): 172; Don J. Wyatt, 
“Confucian Ethical Action and the Boundaries of Peace and War,” in Blackwell Companion to Religion and 
Violence, ed. Andrew R. Murphy (Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 239. 
12 
 
眾之死生、國之存亡繫焉 .33 In a further explanation to his disciples, Zhu affirmed the 
necessity for deliberation and clarity of purpose in war, stating that “Nothing throughout the 
world is more critical than the army and the [imposition of] punishments, so these matters 
cannot be taken lightly. Carelessness when approaching the battlefront formations will result 
in the wrongful killing of many people.” 天下事最大而不可輕者，無過於兵刑。臨陳時，
是胡亂錯殺了幾人.34 
Besides confirming the importance of warfare as a concept requiring careful 
deliberation, Zhu’s comments furthermore suggest a considerably more concrete approach to 
war by invoking the image of the actual battlefield itself. It is in this respect that Zhu departed 
significantly from his scholarly predecessors. Xing Bing 邢昺  (932‒1010), for example, 
interpreted Analects 7:12 solely as a general condemnation of warfare, mostly detached from 
practical considerations: “Weaponry is inauspicious and warfare is perilous, and one is not 
certain of victory. Because [the sovereign] values the life of his people, he must indeed be 
cautious about it.” 夫兵凶戰危，不必其勝，重其民命，固當慎之.35 Whereas Xing treated 
warfare in the abstract, describing it as a generally inauspicious concept to be avoided at all 
costs, Zhu Xi’s use of the concrete imagery of an actual battlefield suggests he assumed 
warfare to be largely inevitable and thus requiring careful deliberation. This reorientation with 
regards to Analects 7:12 not only reaffirms his aforementioned occupation with concrete 
aspects of warfare, but also indicates the necessity of such knowledge for the conduct of 
government. 
Simultaneously, however, several classical passages seem to contradict this 
interpretation. In Mencius 7B:4, Mencius appears to unequivocally condemned military skill: 
“There are people who say: ‘I am skilled at marshalling troops, I am skilled in warfare.’ This 
is a great crime.” 我善為陳，我善為戰。大罪也.36 In no less ambiguous terms, Mencius 
4A:14 similarly suggests that “Those who are skilled in warfare should suffer the highest 
punishment.” 善戰者服上刑.37 This apparent rejection of military ability has led several 
                                                            
33 SSZJJZ, 96. Compare this with Sunzi’s opening statement: “War is a grand affair of the state, a matter of life 
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34 ZZYL, 110.2711. 
35 He Yan 何晏 and Xing Bing 邢昺, ed., Lunyu zhushu 論語註疏, ed. Li Xueqin 李學勤 (Beijing: Beijing 
daxue chubanshe, 1999), 7.89. Hereafter LYZS. 
36 SSZJJZ, 365. 
37 SSZJJZ, 283. 
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modern scholars to cite Mencius as a paragon of a supposed “Confucian pacifism”, with Mark 
E. Lewis labelling him the “most forthright pacifist of ancient China.”38  
In his commentary to these passages, Zhu did not directly rebut these apparent blanket 
condemnations of military knowledge, noting solely that “‘Those who are skilled at warfare’ 
refers to the followers of Sun Bin and Wu Qi.” 善戰，如孫臏吳起之徒 . 39  Zhu Xi’s 
seemingly tacit agreement with Mencius’ condemnation of these bingjia and their military 
skill, implied by the absence of further qualifying or explanatory commentary, appears at odds 
with much of the preceding. Before addressing this tension any further, I will first examine 
more closely the status of military policy within Zhu’s broader theory on government practice 
and identify its relation with the notion of moral cultivation. 
 
1.2 Military policy and the theory of government 
Besides technical knowledge on topics like troop formations, the conduct of warfare 
furthermore requires certain material preparations. This topic is brought to the fore in 
Analects 12:7, where disciple Zigong 子貢 asks Confucius about the preconditions for proper 
government. According to the most common interpretation of this passage, Confucius 
supposedly pointed to three preconditions: “Ensure sufficient food, sufficient weaponry, and 
the confidence of the people.” 足食，足兵，民信之矣.40 When Zigong subsequently asked 
which of these three Confucius would discard first, he tellingly answered: “I would discard 
weaponry.” 去兵.41 As traditional commentators have likewise suggested, Confucius’ concise 
answer suggests he considered military preparations inferior to both agricultural provisions 
and popular trust. Xing Bing, for example, commented: “Because weapons are instruments of 
evil, destroyers of the people, and squanderers of material wealth, he would discard them first.” 
以兵者凶器，民之殘也，財用之蠹也，故先去之.42 
 Contrasting with both modern and traditional interpretations of this passage, Zhu Xi 
instead interpreted the third clause of Confucius’ answer, popular trust (minxin 民信), not as a 
                                                            
38 Mark E. Lewis, Sanctioned Violence in Early China (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990), 
129. 
39 SSZJJZ, 283. 
40 This interpretation of food, weaponry, and popular trust as three separate conditions is maintained in several 
prominent translations. See for example James Legge, The Chinese Classics, Vol. 1 (Taipei: SMC Publishing, 
1991), 254; Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 164; and Edward 
Slingerland, Confucius Analects: with Selections from Traditional Commentaries (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003), 
128. 
41 SSZJJZ, 134. 
42 LYZS, 12.160. 
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third precondition for benevolent government but rather as the end effect that is realized after 
both food and weapons are sufficiently provided for. While Zhu similarly noted that 
weaponry should be discarded before food, his concluding remarks indicate he did not 
consider this to be the main point of the passage: “To speak of it from the perspective of 
popular sentiments: one’s trustworthiness will only find acceptance among the people when 
weapons and food are sufficiently provided for.” 以人情而言，則兵食足而後吾之信可以孚
於民.43 Contrasting sharply with recent interpretations of Analects 12:7, which have focused 
primarily on the unimportance of military policy suggested by Confucius’ short answer,44 Zhu 
Xi interpreted the passage as a positive affirmation of the importance of concrete military 
preparation as a legitimate concern of the ruler. 
This practical and partly utilitarian approach appears closely related to Zhu’s views on 
other aspects of government policy. One instructive example of this approach is provided in 
Analects 2:3, in which Confucius describes a distinction between punishment and regulatory 
degree on the one hand and government by virtue and ritual on the other. Both traditional and 
modern commentators have interpreted this passage as a condemnation of punishments and 
decrees, favoring instead the transformative force of moral virtue.
45
 By contrast, Zhu Xi 
argued that these more mundane forms of government activity were equally legitimate and 
indeed indispensable, serving to correct those individuals who proved unreceptive to the 
transformative force of virtue. Explaining Analects 2:3 to his disciples, he stated: “As some 
will not conform when you put them in line [with virtue and ritual], you cannot dispense with 
punishments.” 齊之不從，則刑不可廢.46 Pointing to the importance of punishment as a 
complement to virtue, Zhu Xi even complained directly to Emperor Xiaozong in 1188 that 
sentencing had become too lenient in recent years.
47
 
In sum, one may relate Zhu Xi’s views on military preparation to a broader conception 
of what constituted legitimate government activity. Zhu Xi did not put his trust solely in the 
transformative force of moral virtue; more practical implements such as armies and 
punishments remained integral to the governmental toolbox. However, while this contradicts 
the objections raised in passages like Mencius 4A:14 and 7B:4, in regard to which, in his 
commentary, Zhu seemed to tacitly reject the value of military knowledge and, by extension, 
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its actual application by the sovereign, it does not yet adequately explain the underlying 
contradiction.  
Before addressing this tension more closely, it is essential to note that Zhu did not 
conceptualize weaponry and punishments as wholly equal, complementary counterparts to 
moral virtue, operating alongside it on an equal level or plane within his theory on 
government practice. Instead, he envisioned a sequential process between the two aspects, in 
which moral cultivation served to precede and inform the practical implements of government. 
The theoretical foundation Zhu Xi gradually developed for this approach is described 
most succinctly in the first section of his commentary to the Great Learning, not formally 
completed until 1189.
48
 According to Zhu’s reading of the first section of this text, the proper 
way of governing the realm consisted of two distinct stages, namely the moral ordering of 
oneself (“elucidating illustrious virtue” ming mingde 明明德) and the moral ordering of 
others (“reinvigorating the people” xinmin 新民 ). To indicate the sequential order of 
precedence between these two stages, Zhu classified them as respectively the “root” (ben 本) 
and its accompanying “tip” (mo 末). The foundational “root” of governance consisted purely 
of moral self-cultivation, involving the investigation of things (gewu 格物 ), advancing 
knowledge to the utmost (zhizhi 致知), making one’s thoughts sincere (chengyi 誠意), and 
rectifying one’s mind (zhengxin 正心). Central to this effort was the proper identification of 
Principle, the universal moral pattern that informed all matters and determined how they 
should ideally run their course. Only after one had gained a proper understanding of Principle, 
one became capable of giving morally correct expression to the “tip” of governance, 
involving the ordering of one’s household (qijia 齊家), the government of the state (zhiguo 治
國), and ultimately the pacification of the world (ping tianxia 平天下).49 The two stages were 
inseparably connected: while the “root” as personal cultivation served to inform and 
determine the expression of the “tip”, the “tip” in turn represented the ultimate extension of 
one’s individual morality to the rest of society.50 
As indispensable tools of the ruler, punishments and military preparations constituted 
integral components of the second stage or “tip” of governance. In response to a question 
posed by a disciple about “reinvigorating the people”, Zhu explained: “It is to use ritual, 
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music, institutions of law, government regulations, and punishments to rid [the people] of 
their old impurities.” 有禮樂、法度、政刑，使之去舊汙也.51 The connection between the 
“tip” of governance and military policy in particular was made explicit by Zhu in reference to 
the aforementioned Analects 15:1, in which Confucius refused to teach Duke Ling of Wei 
about troop formations. In his Questions on the Four Books (Sishu Huowen 四書或問), Zhu 
Xi explained the relation to his disciples: “Speaking of the military, then troop formations are 
certainly the ‘tip’. Speaking of the Way of governing, then the military, in turn, is the ‘tip’.” 
以兵而言，陳固兵之末；以治道而言，則兵又治道之末也.52 Since, as noted earlier, in 
Zhu Xi’s reading of the text Duke Ling was a particularly objectionable ruler, one may 
assume he had not devoted much of his energy to the “root” of governance, his own moral 
constitution. 
Unbound by moral considerations and a regard for “things as they should be” as 
determined by Principle, the formulation and execution of military policy could not reliably 
result in sustainable government: “Although the state is rich, its people will be poor; although 
the army is strong, its state will be defective; although material gain is nearby, its damaging 
effect will appear in the distance.” 國雖富，其民必貧；兵雖彊，其國必病；利雖近，其
為害也必遠 .53  In sum, while Zhu Xi conceptualized concrete military preparation as a 
legitimate and indeed necessary concern of the ruler, such policy should always be informed 
by a properly cultivated moral constitution. As he himself summarized it between 1189 and 
1192: “People say that the benevolent should not manage armies and the righteous should not 
manage wealth. I say that only the benevolent may manage armies and only the righteous may 
manage wealth.” 人言仁不可主兵，義不可主財。某謂，惟仁可以主兵，義可以主財.54 
 
1.3: Principle and just war 
Moral considerations based on Principle should ideally inform not only the formulation and 
execution of military policy, but also the conduct of war itself and the reasons one might 
maintain to engage in it. It is on this point that I may return to the problematic Mencius 
sections 4A:14 and 7B:4 and address the tension between their apparent condemnation of 
military capability and Zhu Xi’s considerably more positive attitude toward the topic. As I 
pointed out earlier, Zhu noted in his commentary to 4A:14 that he interpreted the target of 
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Mencius’ condemnation as a rather particular group of individuals: “‘Those who are skilled at 
warfare’ refers to the followers of Sun Bin and Wu Qi.” 善戰，如孫臏吳起之徒.55 While 
Zhu occasionally cited the works of these bingjia in positive terms, he disagreed with them on 
a fundamental issue. At the heart of this disagreement lay the accusation that the militarists 
had inverted the sequential order between the cultivation of the “root” and its accompanying 
“tip”, effectively subordinating moral cultivation to the needs of warfare. In a letter addressed 
to Liu Gongfu 劉共父, he discussed the matter within the context of preparation against the 
contemporaneous Jurchen Jin:  
 
Internal cultivation and putting ourselves in order lies at the root of what we should 
concern ourselves with; it is not something we should do only after having formed the 
desire to make others our enemy. […] That is precisely why Guan Zhong, Lord Shang, 
Wu Qi, and Shen Buhai ultimately ran afoul of the followers of the Sage, despite not 
being completely without merit. 夫內修自治，本是吾事所當為，非欲與人為敵然
後為之 […] 彼管仲、商君、吳起、申不害非無一切之功，而所以卒得罪於聖人
之門者.56 
 
Zhu Xi’s objection to both militarists and legalists, here addressed together, centered on the 
inversion of ben and mo that allegedly characterized their thought. As a consequence, they 
had “Awakened in the ruler a heart that was willing to exhaust his troops in wanton acts of 
aggression.” 啟人君窮兵黷武之心.57 Such aggressive acts of violence proceeded solely from 
a desire to procure territory and material benefit without regard for the people’s welfare, 
resulting in particularly destructive engagements: “When war is waged to contest land, the 
slaughtered fill the fields; when war is waged to contest cities, the slaughtered fill the cities.” 
爭地以戰，殺人盈野；爭城以戰，殺人盈城.58 Consequently, as noted earlier, Mencius 
argued that such rulers deserved the “highest punishment”. However, contrary to the 
suggestion that this served as a blanket condemnation of all warfare, one may infer at this 
point that for Zhu Xi this charge was aimed solely at those rulers who had neglected the “root” 
of government and instead focused solely on the “tip”. Due to the subsequent lack of an 
ethical foundation, this naturally resulted in particularly bloody wars of conquest. 
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Simultaneously, several comments suggest that Zhu Xi in fact considered particular 
acts of warfare not just acceptable but indeed morally imperative, consistently invoking 
Principle as the primary determinant of what qualified as such “righteous” military action. 
One instructive example is presented in Analects 14:22, where Confucius is described as 
requesting that an armed force is sent to suppress Chen Heng 陳恆, who had reportedly 
murdered his lord in the neighboring state of Qi 齊 and usurped his throne. As the act of 
regicide violated the first of the five cardinal relations (wulun 五倫), Zhu Xi demanded severe 
punishment: “For the subject to murder his lord is the greatest perversion of the human 
relations, something Heavenly Principle does not tolerate.” 臣弒其君，人倫之大變，天理
所不容.59 This normative line of argumentation contrasts sharply with a related account in the 
Chunqiu zuozhuan 春秋左傳 , where it is instead claimed that Confucius’ primary 
considerations were strategic and perhaps even opportunist in nature, not unlike the bingjia 
tacticians: “Chen Heng murdered his lord. Half the people of Qi do not support him; if we add 
these to the multitudes of Lu, he can be vanquished.” 陳恆弒其君，民之不予者半。以魯之
眾，加齊之半，可克也.60 Citing the words of his intellectual predecessor Cheng Yi 程頤 
(1033–1107), Zhu Xi simply dismissed these suggestions and reaffirmed the primary 
importance of the moral cause: “These were not the words of Confucius. If he truly spoke like 
this, then he would be basing himself on strength instead of righteousness. […] Regarding the 
method of defeating Qi, this was a secondary matter to Confucius.” 此非孔子之言。誠若此
言，是以力不以義也[…]至於所以勝齊者，孔子之餘事也.61 
The final lines of Zhu Xi’s response neatly encapsulate the order of precedence 
between the “root” and “tip” of government and the allowance it made for certain acts of 
armed intervention. At the root of Zhu’s interpretation lay the observation that murdering 
one’s lord was an offense punishable by death, based on a prior identification of Principle. In 
other words, contrary to recent suggestions that Zhu Xi’s philosophical framework inspired a 
“growing trend of pacifism and aversion to war”,62 its core principle of moral self-cultivation 
as the “root” of government unambiguously mandated military action if certain conditions 
were met. Furthermore, while it was unthinkable for the sage to initiate war based on anything 
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but a thorough investigation of Principle, he simultaneously introduced the possibility of 
material and strategic considerations. Although Zhu objected to the Zuozhuan account in 
which Confucius was primarily occupied with the question of how to defeat Qi as a state, his 
final line suggests he did not dismiss such considerations outright and indeed allowed them 
“secondary” status (yushi 餘事) as the “tip” of warfare. Emphasizing the inextricable relation 
between morality and practice in this particular case of military strategy, Zhu explained to his 
students: “Whenever the Sage handled affairs, it was not that he only understood moral 
Principle and did not inquire at all into the [practical] merits and demerits of the case; 
something has to be actually feasible for one to accomplish it.” 聖人舉事，也不會只理會義
理，都不問些利害，事也須是可行方得.63 
 
Conclusion 
Zhu Xi’s commentaries indicate a consistent occupation with military affairs as a legitimate 
and indeed vital aspect of proper government, functioning comparably to legal punishment 
and regulation by decree within his broader theory on legitimate governmental practice. 
However, drawing on the inextricable, sequential relationship he envisioned between the “root” 
of moral cultivation and its accompanying “tip”, Zhu Xi argued that as the “tip” of 
governmental practice such policies should always proceed from a systematic investigation 
into Principle as the normative determinant of things “as they should be”. He applied similar 
considerations to the conduct of war itself, arguing that certain violations of Principle not only 
allowed but even mandated military intervention. In the following chapter, I will assess how 
these considerations shaped Zhu Xi’s conceptualization of one particular type of righteous 
warfare, namely the punitive campaign. 
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2. The Punitive Paradigm 
The aim of the current chapter is to assess Zhu Xi’s conceptualization of the punitive 
campaign (zheng 征 or zhengfa 征伐), described in recent literature as the only sanctioned 
form of warfare within the Confucian tradition.
64
 I examine three key aspects of the punitive 
paradigm that prove particularly significant for my later discussion of Zhu Xi’s views on 
contemporaneous issues. In the first section I address the relation between the use of armed 
force and the supposed ideal of non-violent attraction of foreign elements, arguing that Zhu Xi 
saw both inspiring virtue and military force as complimentary necessities for punitive warfare. 
In the second section I address the ideal of political and military centralization as a primary 
function of the punitive paradigm. Focusing on Zhu Xi’s conceptualization of the Mandate of 
Heaven, I argue that Zhu Xi considered the creation and maintenance of centralized military 
order a political ideal, albeit one subject to strategic and historical considerations. In the third 
and final section I assess the relation that Zhu envisioned between punitive warfare and 
barbarian encroachment, arguing that he viewed the perceived barbarian incapacity for change 
as a justification for military action. 
 
2.1 Moral power and military force 
One recurring characteristic of the punitive expedition, as it features throughout the Four 
Books, is that it functions primarily as a last resort. Preferable by far was the conversion of 
foreign or hostile peoples through less violent means. Zhu Xi himself described this ideal in 
his commentary to Analects 16:1, which narrates Confucius’ disapproval of a plan to attack 
the statelet Zhuanyu 颛臾. He commented: 
 
Cultivate order inside [yourself and the state], and thereafter far-away peoples will 
submit. If there are some who do not submit, then cultivate your virtue [further] to 
cause them to come to you; you indeed should not wear out your troops in far-away 
places. 內治修，然後遠人服。有不服，則修德以來之，亦不當勤兵於遠.65 
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A prototypical description of this kind of moral attraction was identified by Zhu Xi in another 
passage in his Commentaries on the Four Books, Mencius 2A:3, where it is suggested that the 
legendary Shang King Tang 商湯王 and Zhou King Wen 周文王 had initially accumulated 
their empires through the attractive force of their moral virtue.
66
 When he discussed this 
passage with his disciples, he pointed to the moral exemplars Tang and Wen, who had 
faithfully served alleged tyrants for years before taking up arms, to explain that military action 
was legitimized only when all attempts at peaceful conversion had failed: 
 
When Tang was subservient to Ge and when King Wen was still subservient to the 
Kun barbarians, they served them with the hope they would repent their evil ways. 
How could [Tang and Wen] have waited solely to launch a punitive campaign against 
them? It was exactly as it should have been. 湯之事葛，文王事昆夷，其本心所以事
之之時，猶望其有悔悟之心。必待伐之，豈得已哉？亦所當然耳.67 
 
Observing that the resulting type of punitive warfare was founded directly on a paradigm of 
peaceful, virtue-based conversion, recent scholarship has argued that these and similar 
expeditions, as they featured within the Four Books, should be interpreted as idealized, 
virtually “bloodless” encounters.68 In this view, victory depended not on military strength and 
strategy but on the attractive power of benevolence (ren) and rightness (yi) to assuage 
hostilities and convert enemies.
69
 Functioning identically to the ideal of peaceful attraction 
outlined above, the punitive army would find little use for their weaponry as enemies deserted 
their unjust overlord and joined the righteous assailants. One of the most explicit pieces of 
evidence for the supposed belief in the non-violent nature of punitive warfare is found in the 
main text of Mencius 7B:3, where Mencius challenged the account provided in the Book of 
Documents (Shangshu 尚書) of the notorious battle at Muye 牧野 , fought between the 
allegedly tyrannical Shang king Zhòu 紂王 and the man subsequently known as Zhou king 
Wu 武. Citing the benevolent character of Wu, Mencius argued that the received account of 
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the battle, which claimed that “blood flowed [so profusely that] it set afloat wooden pestles” 
其血之流杵, could not have been correct.70 
Zhu Xi’s commentary on Mencius 7B:3 portrays a rather different approach to 
punitive warfare, ultimately suggesting his acceptance of the unavoidability of armed 
confrontation. Claiming in his interlinear commentary that the sight of Wu’s army had caused 
Zhòu’s troops to abandon their ranks and turn on their fellow soldiers in despair, Zhu 
explained that the Shang carnage was partly self-incurred: “The people of the Shang murdered 
each other; it is not so that King Wu murdered them.” 商人自相殺，非謂武王殺之也.71 
While Zhu Xi’s final statement could plausibly be taken to imply that he believed Wu’s troops 
took no part in the battle at all, in apparent accordance with the recent claim that a punitive 
army “would not have to bloody its swords”,72 other statements on the topic indicate Zhu did 
not fully believe this to be true. Discussing Wu’s military campaigns with his disciples in 
1191, he acknowledged the possibility that many enemy combatants had indeed been slain by 
Wu or his soldiers. However, what separated him from less benevolent rulers throughout 
history, in Zhu Xi’s view, was the relatively limited scale of his engagements:  
 
The way the ancients employed troops differed from that of later times. […] I have 
never believed they murdered four or five hundred thousand men [on a single 
occasion], like the people of later ages have. But to say they have killed many people, 
this I believe. 古人用兵，與後世不同 […] 那曾做後世樣殺人，或十五萬，或四十
萬，某從來不信。謂之多殺人，信有之.73 
 
Consequently, the provision and use of actual weaponry remained indispensable, as Zhu 
explained in a conversation with his disciples in the 1180s: “It is not the case that he did not 
use troops. Rather, his employment of troops was simply different from the [rulers of] the 
warring states of that time, who lacked moral Principle.” 非不用兵也，特其用兵，不若當
時戰國之無義理耳.74 While some people could indeed be converted without the use of force, 
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it appears that some force remained necessary for those who proved unreceptive to the 
influence of virtue. 
In sum, Zhu Xi’s comments point to two distinct but seemingly related aspects of 
punitive warfare. While he conceptualized the attractive force of moral virtue as an integral 
aspect of the punitive campaign, he also indicated on several occasions that actual violent 
conflict was not wholly avoidable; as long as it was guided by an understanding of Principle, 
this was not necessarily a problem. Rather than arguing for an either-or dichotomy between 
moral cultivation and armed intervention, it appears he instead conceptualized them as 
complimentary aspects, possibly even at work simultaneously during a campaign. 
 
2.2 Warfare and political order 
Punitive warfare, as it featured in the Mencius and Analects, was aimed at both the creation 
and the maintenance of a centralized political order. As several scholars have recently argued, 
it was characterized by hierarchism as well as hegemonism: as the imposition of a unifying 
moral order by those who had a claim to it upon those who had not, the punitive paradigm 
assumed a fundamental status inequality between the former and the latter.
75
 As Wyatt has 
noted, this type of warfare sought to translate a presumed moral authority into a political 
hegemony, serving to impose the norms of its underlying moral system on those who proved 
unwilling or incapable of adhering to them.
76
 The centralization of military authority played 
an important part in Zhu Xi’s conceptualization of this ideal; yet, as we shall see below, its 
practice was deeply sensitive to the demands of historical and strategic circumstance. 
One of the most explicit articulations of this objective is found in Analects 16:2: 
“When the Way prevails throughout the world, then ritual, music, and punitive campaigns all 
proceed from the Son of Heaven.” 天下有道，則禮樂征伐自天子出.77 Zhu’s commentary to 
this passage suggests he considered this a matter of Principle, to be complied with lest one 
invariably loses power altogether: “The more severely you go against [this] Principle, the 
faster you will lose [authority].” 逆理愈甚，則其失之愈速 . 78  That Zhu considered 
centralized military agency essential, is suggested in even less ambiguous terms in his 
commentary to the aforementioned Analects 16:1, which describes how the supposedly 
illegitimate overlord of Lu 鲁 desired to launch a punitive attack on Zhou vassal Zhuanyu. 
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Zhu noted that Principle itself determined the fundamental inappropriateness of such an action: 
“Zhuanyu was a fiefdom created by the former kings [of the Zhou], so no one may attack it. 
[…] This is the ultimate ideal according to the Principle of the matter, an unchanging, settled 
essence.” 顓臾乃先王封國，則不可伐 […] 此事理之至當，不易之定體.79 As the Zhou 
house still (nominally) occupied the chief position in the political system during Confucius’ 
lifetime, Principle itself determined in absolute terms its monopoly over the conduct of 
warfare. 
This assertion of centralized authority as an absolute norm contrasts sharply with 
statements Zhu Xi made elsewhere. Perhaps most contrastive is Analects 14:22, which, as I 
have described previously, portrays Confucius himself as pleading directly with the duke of 
Lu, not the Zhou Son of Heaven, to send armed forces to Qi and depose the usurper Chen 
Heng. In his interlinear comments to this passage, Zhu Xi first appeared to circumvent the 
issue by stating that, considering the severity of the offense, anyone could take unilateral 
action: “This [crime] is something Heavenly Principle does not tolerate. Anyone may 
apprehend and execute him, let alone neighboring states!” 天理所不容，人人得而誅之，況
鄰國乎 . 80  Several lines later, however, he continued by citing seemingly conflicting 
statements attributed to his predecessor Cheng Yi: “The intent of Confucius was certainly to 
call the crime by its proper name, report to the Son of Heaven above, and report to the local 
notables below.” 若孔子之志，必將正名其罪，上告天子，下告方伯 . 81  When Zhu 
elaborated on this same passage in the Questions on the Four Books, he concluded that 
historical circumstances would determine which course to take, but stopped short of 
explaining which applied to the case of Analects 14:22.
82
 
In the first analysis, therefore, there appears to be certain ambiguity regarding Zhu 
Xi’s thought on the value of centralized military authority and, by extension, its function 
within the received text of the Analects. This has led the modern scholar Yao Xinzhong to 
doubt the extent to which centralized moral authority, previously described as a fundamental 
characteristic of the punitive paradigm, indeed represented a necessary or even important 
factor.
83
 David Graff, citing several passages in the Mencius that similarly suggest an 
allowance for decentralized warfare, has argued instead that Zhou influence had eroded to 
                                                            
79 SSZJJZ, 170. 
80 SSZJJZ, 154. 
81 SSZJJZ, 155. 
82 ZZQS, 6:831–3. 
83 Yao Xinzhong, “Confucian Perspective,” 97. 
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such an extent by the time of Mencius and even Confucius before him that its authority had 
become negotiable and decentralized military action permissible.
84
 As I will argue below, 
neither suggestion appears fully applicable to Zhu Xi’s views. To this end, I shall first 
examine the nature of the political order punitive warfare was meant to sustain and the 
cosmological principles that determined its legitimacy. 
At the foundation of this political order lay what is commonly translated as the 
“mandate of Heaven” (tianming).85 Recent interpretations have described the term as either a 
transcendental standard of sanctioned conduct, or, from an immanental perspective, as the 
“totality of conditions and potentialities” constituted by contingent historical and social 
forces.
86
 Zhu Xi’s conceptualization of tianming reflected key aspects of both perspectives. 
Commenting on the first line of the Doctrine of the Mean, “The Mandate of Heaven is called 
‘inborn nature’” 天命之謂性,87 Zhu explained:  
 
Inborn nature is Principle. Heaven transforms and creates the myriad things through 
yin and yang and the five phases, using vital energy to create form, and Principle is 
indeed bestowed on all things; it is like a mandate or a command. 性，即理也。天以
陰陽五行化生萬物，氣以成形，而理亦賦焉，猶命令也.88 
 
Crucial to one’s understanding of Zhu Xi’s vision is his identification of the “mandate of 
Heaven” with Principle, earlier described as the universal pattern that determined how all 
things should ideally run their course, in accordance with the chief virtues that constituted 
Zhu’s moral universe. Accordingly, one could interpret Zhu’s view of tian as a transcendental 
standard, an ideal course “mandated” to all things in the process of their creation. 
Simultaneously, however, Zhu emphasized the creative and transformative interplay between 
Principle and “vital force” (qi 氣) along the directions of yin 陰 and yang 陽 and the five 
phases (wuxing 五行), resulting in a cosmology that was determined by the interactions of all 
its particular constituents. Put concretely, the particular way in which individuals could (and 
                                                            
84 Graff, “Righteous War,” 205.  
85 Few modern analyses of Zhu’s tianming discuss its political implications, instead focusing predominantly on 
its metaphysical foundation. See for example Wing-tsit Chan, Chu Hsi: New Studies (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1989), 212–21. 
86 For the transcendental interpretation, see Herrlee Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China. Vol. 1: The 
Western Chou Empire (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 82; Yao Xinzhong, “Confucian 
Perspective,” 92–6. For the immanental perspective, see Stroble, “Justification of War,” 175–8. 
87 SSZJJZ, 17. 
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should) give expression to their Heaven-bestowed inborn morality was dependent on societal 
and historical circumstances.
89
 In sum, the transcendental standard of Principle that lay at the 
root of Zhu’s conceptualization of the Mandate, and thereby the moral ground for punitive 
warfare, was always contextualized. 
As the primary locus of this contextualization, society ultimately determined the 
“bearer” of the Mandate as a functional analogy to Heaven itself.90 One important example of 
this mechanism, discussed on multiple occasions by Zhu himself, is presented in the narrative 
of the last Shang King Zhòu and his relations with Zhou kings Wen and Wu. Whereas Wen is 
traditionally said to have served Zhòu loyally throughout his life, his successor Wu eventually 
deposed Zhòu when popular opinion of him had deteriorated to such an extent that he lost the 
Mandate.
91
 Particularly relevant for my present purposes is Zhu Xi’s repeated observation that 
although Wen had conducted several major campaigns during his appointment, he did not 
unilaterally engage in military action not directly sanctioned by Zhòu within territories still 
loyal to him, let alone strike at Zhòu himself.
92
 Citing his intellectual predecessor Zhang Zai 
張載 (1020–1077) in his commentary, Zhu noted: “As [Zhòu] was not yet cut off from 
Heaven’s Mandate, they interacted as befitted lord and minister.” 天命未絕，則是君臣.93  
The determining factor that ultimately negated this stricture and legitimated Wu’s 
armed intervention was described by Zhu as “nothing but human emotion” 人情而已.94 The 
significance of this final remark lies in the observation that Zhang Zai (and Zhu Xi after him) 
had claimed that human emotion (renqing 人情) functioned as the real-world expression of 
one’s inborn nature, itself identical with Principle.95 Although Principle represented certain 
absolute, transcendental norms, it was functionally immanent in the people. As such, their 
overwhelmingly negative emotional response to Zhòu’s tyranny represented the 
contextualized expression of an underlying, transcendental moral foundation. Conversely, as 
                                                            
89 Kirill Thompson, “Li and Yi as Immanent: Chu Hsi’s Thought in Practical Perspective,” Philosophy East and 
West 38:1 (1988): 37–40. 
90 Zhu noted in 1191: “How does one receive the Mandate from Heaven? It is simply so that the people and 
Heaven are identical.” 命如何受於天？只是人與天同. ZZYL, 81.2126. 
91 SSZJJZ, 222. 
92 ZZYL, 51.1229. SSZJJZ, 282. 
93 SSZJJZ, 222.  
94 Ibid.  
95 Qian Mu, Xinxue’an, 2:25–30. See Zhang Zai 張載, Zhang Zai ji 張載集 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1978), 
374. 
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long as the people had not yet indicated Zhòu’s loss of the mandate, Wen’s political and 
indeed military subservience was unnegotiable.
96
 
By the time of Confucius and Mencius, the Zhou house had similarly lost a significant 
share of its political legitimacy, reflected in popular indifference to its status and 
discontentment with the violence that accompanied its waning authority. However, Zhu found 
that this process was not yet irreversible during Confucius’ lifetime:  
 
Even though the Zhou house had faded into obscurity by the time of Confucius, the 
world still recognized the rightness of honoring it. This is why ‘honoring the Zhou’ 
constituted the foundation of the Spring and Autumn Annals. By the time of Mencius, 
seven states vied for supremacy and no longer did the world know a Zhou existed; 
popular distress had become extreme. By that time, if a feudal prince could practice 
the Kingly Way, he may reign. 孔子之時，周室雖微，天下猶知尊周之為義，故春
秋以尊周為本。至孟子時，七國爭雄，天下不復知有周，而生民之塗炭已極。
當是時，諸侯能行王道，則可以王矣.97 
 
At this point I may resume my previous discussion of Analects 14:22, in which Confucius 
appeared to support unilateral military action independent of the Zhou house. Contrasting 
with statements by Graff and Yao cited earlier, it seems that Zhu Xi did not in fact consider 
the legitimacy of the Zhou house at the time of Confucius to be negotiable, as it had not yet 
lost the mandate. However, as it had suffered significant territorial and institutional losses, 
historical circumstances had created leeway for decentralized military action, as long as it was 
aimed precisely at reviving its political authority. Once “the Way prevailed throughout the 
world” 天下有道,98 as it was suggested in Analects 16:2, military authority would again be 
the sole prerogative of the Son of Heaven. 
In sum, it appears that while Zhu Xi conceptualized centralized military authority as 
the “absolute ideal according to the Principle of the matter” 事理之至當,99 he simultaneously 
remained sensitive to the demands of historical and strategic circumstance.
100
 
                                                            
96 Zhu repeated this argument in three separate letters: in 1163 to Fan Bochong 范伯崇 (WJ, 39.1771–3), in 1166 
to Xu Yuanpin 徐元聘 (WJ, 39.1757–8), and in 1191 to Chen Chun 陳淳 (WJ, 57.2731–42). For the dating of 
these letters, see Chen Lai, Kaozheng, 28, 40, 344. 
97 SSZJJZ, 205. 
98 SSZJJZ, 171. 
99 SSZJJZ, 170. 
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2.3 Barbarians within the punitive paradigm 
The insistence on the centralization of political order is reflected in Zhu Xi’s approach to what 
he termed barbarians (yidi 夷狄). Although he consistently invoked the supposed barbarian 
nature of the Jurchen Jin throughout most of his recorded statements concerned with practical 
contemporaneous issues, the topic featured only sporadically in his classical commentaries.
101
 
Nevertheless, the several references made to barbarians specifically within the context of 
armed conflict demonstrate a high degree of thematic unity. At the heart of this approach lay a 
fundamental, ethnocentric distinction between a cultured political center and an ever-present, 
barbaric periphery.
102
 As Yang Shao-yun has pointed out, Zhu’s conceptualization of political 
legitimacy depended in part on the ability of the cultured center to maintain this division.
103
 
This ideal is reflected in Zhu’s commentary to Analects 14:17, where he discussed the merit 
of reformer Guan Zhong 管仲 (725–654 BCE). Noting Guan’s role in the unification of the 
central states against barbarian encroachment, he concluded: “Honoring the House of Zhou 
and repelling the barbarians are two ways of bringing order to the world.” 尊周室，攘夷狄，
皆所以正天下也.104 
Zhu traced the conjunction of these supposedly interrelated ideals to another of the 
classics, the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu 春秋), and claimed on multiple occasions 
that they constituted its most fundamental principles. As Zhu explained to his disciples on one 
occasion after 1189: “To maintain the Chinese states as internal and the barbarians as external, 
this is the main point of the Spring and Autumn Annals; one must understand this.” 內諸夏，
外夷狄，此春秋之大旨，不可不知也.105 While Zhu undoubtedly focused chiefly on the 
issue of governance on the internal (Chinese) side of the dichotomy, as Hoyt Tillman has 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
100 As I shall discuss more closely in chapter 6, this nuanced approach may have similarly informed Zhu Xi’s 
views on Song military centralization. 
101 For example, Zhu referred to the Jurchen as yidi or lu 虜 “caitiff” in official memorials presented in 1162, 
1163, 1188, 1189, and 1194. Cf. WJ, 11.569–80; 13.631–7; 11.589–614; 12.617–26; 12.626–30. 
102 The partly spatial nature of this distinction is embodied in the cartographical genre entitled huayi tu 華夷圖. 
According to Luo Dajing 羅大經 (1194–1242), Zhu Xi had once intended to produce such a map himself; see 
Luo Dajing 羅大經 , Helin yulu 鶴林玉露  (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1983), 3:3.282. For the increasing 
popularity of this type of map among Song literati, see Hilde De Weerdt, Information, Territory, and Networks: 
The Crisis and Maintenance of Empire in Song China (Cambridge: Harvard Asia Center, Harvard University 
Press, 2015), 112–7. 
103 Yang Shao-yun, “Reinventing the Barbarian: Rhetorical and Philosophical Uses of the Yi-Di in Mid-Imperial 
China” (PhD. Diss., University of California, 2014), 343–4. 
104 SSZJJZ, 153. 
105 ZZYL, 83.2173. 
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rightly pointed out, one should not underestimate the concrete importance he simultaneously 
attached to the external issue.
106
 Indicating that the theoretical issue was inextricably tied to 
concrete politics, Zhu claimed in the 1180s that the 1141 peace treaty with the Jurchen had led 
to widespread disregard of this fundamental ideal: “Ever since Qin Hui made peace with the 
barbarians, scholars have avoided speaking of the [difference between] internal and external, 
so the great meaning of the Annals has become obscured.” 自秦檜和戎之後，士人諱言內外，
而春秋大義晦矣 . 107  In Zhu’s estimation, the post-1127 failure to militarily “repel the 
barbarians” (rangyi 攘夷) had led to the contravention of the most central teachings of the 
Annals. 
Besides dividing the two entities along spatial lines, Zhu Xi also appears to have 
distinguished between them in terms of agency, consistently describing the barbarian element 
as a passive, reactive counterpart to the active cultural center. He cited the words of Fan Zuyu 
范祖禹  (1041–1098) to explain this relationship in his Outlines and Details of the 
Comprehensive Mirror (Tongjian gangmu 通鑒綱目): 
 
To have barbarians in the Central Lands (zhong guo) is like having night during the 
day, shadow in the light, or petty persons among noble men. When the Central Lands 
are misgoverned, the four barbarian tribes encroach one after the other. 中國之有夷狄，
如晝之有夜，陽之有陰，君子之有小人也。中國失政，則四夷交侵.108 
 
While Zhu Xi never explicitly named the cause of this apparently inherent passivity and, by 
implication, inferiority of barbarians, one possible explanation is provided in his discourse on 
inborn nature and the limits to its expression imposed by one’s natural endowment of qi. After 
a discussion on the implications of differences in qi endowment between living things, Zhu 
concluded in 1188: “Barbarians stand somewhere between people and animals, so in the end 
they are difficult to change.” 到得夷狄，便在人與禽獸之間，所以終難改 .109  Recent 
scholarship has been in disagreement over the particulars of this discussion. According to 
Chang Chishen, Zhu argued that barbarians owed their inferiority to a particularly “barbarian” 
                                                            
106 Hoyt Tillman, “Proto-Nationalism in Twelth-Century China? The Case of Ch’en Liang,” Harvard Journal of 
Asiatic Studies 39:2 (1979), 413–4. 
107 ZZYL, 83.2175. 
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inborn nature, derived from “distinctive Principle” (teshu zhili 特殊之理), setting them apart 
from humans who possessed superior distinctive Principle.
110
 In Hoyt Tillman’s interpretation, 
Zhu Xi argued instead that while barbarians shared the same Principle as humans, its proper 
expression was obstructed by their particularly stunted endowment of qi.
111
 Thirdly, Yang 
Shao-yun has proposed that Zhu’s thought may have evolved over time, shifting from the 
former to the latter position through the early 1190s.
112
 For my present purposes, however, the 
ultimate implications of these viewpoints are identical: innate inferiority determined that 
barbarians were physiologically unlikely to develop the human virtues necessary to participate 
properly in the universal moral order. 
On this point one may draw an instructive parallel with Zhu Xi’s theory on legal 
punishment. As suggested in the preceding chapter, Zhu considered punishments necessary to 
correct those individuals who remained unreceptive to the transformative force of moral 
virtue.
113
 As several scholars have recently pointed out, Zhu Xi’s explanation for the relative 
incapacity for moral development inherent in some people was similarly informed by his 
thought on qi endowment.
114
 Because such innately deficient individuals could not be 
expected to comply with the predominant social order of their own accord, for example 
through study and ritual, Zhu considered the forceful application of punishment permissible 
and even necessary to ensure social order. As similarly innately deficient creatures, barbarians 
who proved belligerent necessitated the application of military force.
115
 The military 
“repelling” of aggressive barbarians, then, can be conceptualized as a form of rectifying 
punishment on a much larger scale, aimed at reaffirming their particular position in relation to 
the center of Zhu Xi’s cultural world. 
In sum, it appears that Zhu Xi found non-violent “moral attraction” of the sort I have 
described in the first section of this chapter inapplicable to barbarians he considered to be 
particularly aggressive. The transformative attraction to exemplary virtue would entail the 
rejection of one’s erstwhile belligerent ways, and this kind of moral change is precisely what 
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Zhu’s conception of the barbarian was incapable of. As a result, no non-violent solution could 
plausibly restore the zhong guo to proper order. 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the stated ideal that one should focus on the transformative effect of one’s moral 
virtue instead of “wearing out troops in far-away places”, Zhu Xi indicated that military 
action at times remained necessary to ensure social and political order, especially when faced 
with supposedly deficient groups who could not be expected to participate in Zhu Xi’s 
cultural world of their own accord.
116
 Rather than arguing for an either-or dichotomy between 
moral cultivation with the aim of “peaceful attraction” on the one hand and armed 
intervention on the other, he instead conceptualized them as complimentary aspects. Within 
Zhu’s ideal political order, Principle determined that military policy was the sole prerogative 
of the Son of Heaven, although this ideal was sensitive to the demands of strategy and 
circumstance.
117
 More fundamentally, these findings suggest that Zhu Xi’s approach to 
warfare depended strongly on context and circumstance. I shall explore this notion further in 
the following chapter. 
 
 
  
                                                            
116 As I will demonstrate in chapter 5, Zhu classified the Jurchen barbarians as one such group of creatures 
inherently incapable of adhering to this order, necessitating the use of military force to expel them from the 
zhong guo. 
117 I will discuss the reflection of this approach in Zhu Xi’s thought on military centralization during the Song in 
chapter 6.  
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3. War and Personal Morality 
In the preceding chapters I argued that, under certain circumstances, Zhu Xi considered 
warfare to be unavoidable. The sagely King Wu, for example, was compelled to launch a 
military expedition against the notorious King Zhòu and prevent further suffering among the 
populace. At the same time, however, it is suggested on multiple occasions throughout the 
classical literature that this may have reflected an inadequacy in Wu’s own moral 
constitution.
118
 As I demonstrate in the current chapter, Zhu reformulated his interpretation of 
this contrast at several points throughout his life. In the first section, I address the criteria Zhu 
maintained to determine when one was legitimized to depart from the supposedly ideal, non-
violent methods of conflict resolution and resort to armed intervention. I argue that, by 
gradually framing his ethical system in terms of “standard” (jing 經) and “expedient” (quan 
權 ) and thereby allowing for the historical contextualization of moral judgment, Zhu 
attempted to reconcile his insistence on the universality of Principle with the supposedly 
undesirable yet necessary nature of warfare. In the second section, I further nuance this 
historicized approach and turn to Zhu Xi’s assessment of Wu’s personal morality. By 
discussing a frequently recurring thought experiment between Zhu and his disciples, 
involving a historical comparison between the ancient sages Shun and Wu, I argue that Zhu 
gradually separated Wu’s moral imperfections from his decision to wage war, further 
consolidating his historicized approach to warfare. 
 
3.1 Legitimizing war: the “expedient” 
As noted throughout the preceding chapters, Zhu approached benevolent military 
interventions, such as those conducted by sage kings Tang and Wu, as occasionally necessary 
responses to historical circumstance. As Zhu argued to his disciples in 1193: “At that time a 
group of wicked individuals had assembled [around Zhòu] to harm the realm, and they could 
not be dispersed. King Wu had no choice but to attack.” 當時聚一團惡人為天下害，不能消
散。武王只得去伐 .119  Simultaneously, however, Zhu maintained that such recourses to 
armed conflict should always be considered a last resort, allowable only when the attractive 
force of one’s moral virtue proved ineffective. As noted in the preceding chapter, Zhu Xi’s 
partially immanental conceptualization of the mandate of Heaven, which initially barred Wen 
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8:20 (as compared to his predecessors). 
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and Wu from deposing Zhòu, meant that a correct judgment of human emotion, as the 
functional expression of one’s inborn virtues, played a crucial role in deciding when one was 
legitimated to deviate so extremely from the moral norm.
120
 Discussing this problem in a 
letter to his disciple Chen Chun 陳淳 during the 1190’s, Zhu pointed to the difficulty of 
making such a decision: “This is the point at which the sage uses the expedient. Only those 
who are profound and of incisive righteousness may resolve [such cases]; one cannot discuss 
them using the regular norms.” 到此則聖人用權之地，惟幾微義精者乃可以決之，自不容
以常法論也.121 Only someone possessed of a sagely sense of rightness, Zhu argued, could 
reliably adapt the norm to abnormal situations. 
Recent scholarship has yielded several complementary accounts of Zhu’s 
conceptualization of the expedient (quan) and its relation with the moral standard (jing). 
Essential for a proper understanding of the term is the observation that Zhu Xi, seemingly 
over the course of multiple decades, sought to reconcile two seemingly antithetical 
approaches to moral normativity.
122
 Firstly, scholars identified by Zhu simply as “Han 
dynasty Confucians” had described quan as “being at variance with the standard while 
complying with the Way” 反經合道.123 Cheng Yi, on the other hand, had insisted that the 
universality of Principle meant that “the expedient is the same as the standard” 權即是經,124 
effectively abolishing it as a meaningful term. As Cheng equated “the Way” (dao 道) as 
universal Principle with the “standard”, it was difficult to accept the Han suggestion that 
morally just action could both be at variance and in compliance with it. Zhu initially adopted 
Cheng Yi’s stance in his 1177 commentary to the Analects.125 However, as I shall argue 
below, he simultaneously recognized that there remained some extraordinary events, like 
King Wu’s decision to attack and execute his former lord Zhòu, which clearly deviated from 
any prevalent moral standard. 
                                                            
120 For Zhu’s conceptualization of emotion (qing) as the functional extension of one’s inborn nature (xing) and 
its relation to warfare, see section 2.2. 
121 WJ, 57.2731. Zhu expressed similar reservations to Emperor Ningzong 宋寧宗 in 1194; Cf. WJ, 14.665–7. 
122 Wei Cheng-t’ung, “Chu Hsi on the Standard and the Expedient,” in Chu Hsi and Neo-Confucianism, ed. 
Wing-tsit Chan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1986), 255–61; Tillman, Ascendancy, 168–78; Yue 
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His eventual solution was to reintroduce a certain distinction between “the Way” and 
“the standard” and describe them as operating on two different conceptual levels.126 While 
jing and quan both represented inherently temporary moral norms, with the latter acting as the 
occasional and situational redefinition of the semi-permanent former, the dao as universal 
Principle served to “string together” (guan 貫) and inform both. This appears to corroborate 
my discussion of Heaven (tian) in the preceding chapter, where I noted that while Principle 
represented a universal moral norm, this norm should always be approached by observing the 
particular (social or historical) circumstances that formed its temporary contextualization. Put 
differently, while the standard made a claim to certain transcendent principles, such as the 
five relations (wulun 五倫) and filial piety (xiao 孝), its inherently immanental function 
meant that independent historical or societal change (bian 變) could render these principles 
temporarily untenable.
127
 As Schirokauer has similarly noted, Zhu Xi had developed a 
strongly historicized conceptualization of morality, without yielding to moral relativism.
128
 
Speaking to his disciples in 1193, he cited the examples of the martial sage kings Tang and 
Wu to explain this historicized contextualization of jing and quan: 
 
The [proper relations between] lord and minister and between older brother and 
younger brother are the constant standard of Heaven and earth, something that cannot 
be changed. When Tang and Wu executed Jie and Zhòu, these were indeed cases of 
ministers killing their lords […] how could they not be at variance with the standard! 
However, as the progress of time had reached these particular points, Principle 
determined they should act in the ways they did. Despite being at variance with the 
standard, they indeed complied with Principle. 君臣兄弟，是天地之常經，不可易
者。湯武之誅桀紂，卻是以臣弒君 […] 豈不是反經！但時節到這裏，道理當恁
地做，雖然反經，卻自合道理.129 
 
                                                            
126 Wei Cheng-t’ung, “Standard and Expedient,” 258–9; Yue Tianlei, “Lun quan,” 170–3. 
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conceptualization of quan. 
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By concluding that Tang and Wu were “at variance with the standard yet compliant with the 
Way” as they conducted their punitive campaigns, Zhu indicated his eventual embrace of the 
supposed Han dynasty conceptualization of quan. Corroborating recent suggestions that his 
embrace of the Han position enabled him to accommodate more readily deviant yet 
situationally justifiable behavior,
130
 it appears this changing conceptualization of quan went 
hand-in-hand with his increasingly explicit rationalization of Tang and Wu’s acts of punitive 
war. Accordingly, it was not until the completion of this conceptual shift that Zhu ultimately 
established Tang and Wu as the primary examples of the proper use of the expedient.
131
 
Furthermore, by equating the expedient with Principle itself, Zhu firmly grounded such 
judgments within his broader cosmology.
132
 
These findings contrast sharply with the observations of Wei Cheng-t’ung, who, as the 
only one among recent scholarship to address the cases of Tang and Wu, has rejected Zhu’s 
pronouncements as unacceptable and “absurd”.133 As war and regicide are inherently and 
universally immoral acts, Wei argues, quan cannot be applied to these cases.
134
 As Tang and 
Wu had already been deeply entrenched as venerated sages (shengren 聖人) long before 
Zhu’s writing, Wei continues, Zhu could not but bow under the pressure of tradition and 
similarly idealize their allegedly abhorrent acts of war and regicide.
135
 In other words, it was 
not actual merit but rather their canonical status as sages that supposedly justified their actions 
in Zhu’s eyes. 
While the canonical status of Tang and Wu as shengren may have indeed informed 
Zhu Xi’s judgment, there remain two problems with Wei’s thesis. Firstly, as noted throughout 
                                                            
130 Wei Cheng-t’ung, “Standard and Expedient,” 256, 267–8; Tillman, Ascendancy, 177–8. 
131 In his 1177 commentaries, in which he still explicitly rejected the Han position in favor of Cheng’s theory, 
Zhu at no point suggested any connection between quan and the cases of Tang and Wu. Contrarily, all 12 
instances in the Yulei in which Zhu rationalized the actions of Wu and Tang on the basis of “expediency” were 
recorded between 1193 and 1199. Cf. ZZYL, 35.909, 37.986–95, 49.1205, 51.1229, 58.1365, 62.1484. 
132 I trace Zhu Xi’s association between expediency, sagehood, and military action as far back as his first official 
communication with Emperor Xiaozong in 1162, when he laid out his case against peace with the Jurchen. 
Directly following an initial encouragement for Xiaozong to “accord with Principle as the times dictate” 因時順
理 , involving “extraordinary action and extraordinary merit” 非常之事、非常之功 , he continued by 
emphasizing the foundational importance of the investigation of Principle (WJ, 11.571). One year later, when 
Zhu restated his case for war against the Jurchen before the Emperor, Zhu similarly encouraged Xiaozong to 
study the Classics with the explicit aim of “responding to the endless changes of the age” 應當世無窮之變 (WJ, 
13.632). Although at this point he did not yet employ the terminology of quan and jing, which he would not 
associate explicitly with warfare until the 1190s, his repeated insistence on the connection between moral 
cultivation, historical change, and military action is suggestive of a continuous process of conceptual 
development. 
133 Wei Cheng-t’ung, “Standard and Expedient,” 265. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid., 265, 268. 
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the preceding chapters, no a priori rejection of warfare was possible for Zhu. On the contrary, 
he maintained on several occasions that warfare and even regicide were occasionally 
sanctioned by Principle itself. As such, contrary to Wei’s claims, there is no reason to assume 
that Zhu’s conceptualization of quan as a moral concept was fundamentally inapplicable to 
war. Secondly, while Zhu indeed consistently described the exercise of the “expedient” as the 
sole prerogative of the sage, I would argue that such pronouncements served first and 
foremost to emphasize the particular difficulty of making the moral judgments involved in its 
practice, rather than reflect any sort of dogmatic belief in the inherent infallibility of sages.
136
 
In fact, as I will demonstrate in the following section, Zhu Xi could occasionally be openly 
critical of Wu’s rash behavior during his military campaign.  
As no a priori rejection of warfare was possible in Zhu’s strongly historicized 
conceptualization of morality, it is plausible that his repeated insistence on the good intentions 
of Tang and Wu signified something more than a mere dogmatic concession to accepted 
tradition. As Zhu claimed to his disciples in 1193: “During their punitive campaigns, Tang 
and Wu were fully and solely concerned with a feeling of compassion [and the intention of] 
saving the people; they did not consider anything else.” 湯武之征伐，只知一意惻怛救民而
已，不知其他.137 On another occasion, he furthermore equated such motivations with the 
chief virtue of benevolence (ren 仁) itself.138 While it is true that their canonical status as 
sages may indeed have informed these estimations to some extent, there is no fundamental 
contradiction between these views and his broader moral framework that suggests an artificial 
or dogmatic rationalization on Zhu’s part. One may conclude that, seemingly correlative with 
his gradual embrace of the Han conceptualization of quan and jing towards the middle of the 
1190s, Zhu ultimately firmly grounded the concept of punitive warfare within his Principle-
based ethical framework, gradually envisioning a close conceptual relation between moral 
cultivation, historical change, and military action. 
 
3.2 Zhu Xi’s historicized understanding of war 
In order to reconstruct Zhu Xi’s rationalization of Wu’s armed intervention against Zhòu, I 
have maintained the premise that external, historical circumstances had supposedly prevented 
Wu from exercising the morally preferable alternative, namely that of non-violent conversion 
                                                            
136 For Zhu’s insistence on restricting the “expedient” to the sage, see his letter to Chen Chun cited above. See 
also ZZYL, 37.986–95. 
137 ZZYL, 25.637. Zhu made an identical argument in an undated letter to Xu Yuanpin 徐元聘; cf. WJ, 39.1757. 
138 ZZYL, 53.1277. 
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through the attractive force of his moral virtue.
139
 While I thereby established that Zhu 
considered Wu’s choice ethically justifiable, I have so far neglected to ask the question how 
Wu’s own moral constitution, as described by Zhu, may have determined the ultimate flow of 
events. Put differently, it remains a possibility that Wu’s “inevitable” recourse to war 
stemmed from an inadequacy inherent in Wu’s virtue itself. Recent scholarship and, as I shall 
demonstrate below, Zhu Xi himself have indeed suggested Wu was not perfect.
140
 If true, this 
could imply that Wu’s attack on Zhòu was only “marginally” justifiable; had a more 
cultivated sage been in his place, war might still have been avoidable. In the remainder of this 
section, I will examine how Zhu Xi addressed this speculative problem and assess its 
implications for his broader view on the moral implications of warfare. 
The textual foundation for most of Zhu’s discussions on this topic can be traced to 
Analects 3:25, which describes a comparison between the celebratory musical compositions 
Shao and Wu, attributed to the sage kings Shun and Wu respectively. In the traditional 
understanding of this passage, the provided descriptions are taken to reflect the moral 
qualities of Shun and Wu: “The Master said of the Shao: ‘It is fully excellent as well as fully 
good.’ Of the Wu, he said: ‘It is fully excellent, but not yet fully good’.” 子謂韶，盡美矣又
盡善也；謂武，盡美矣未盡善也 .141  Among Zhu’s commentatorial predecessors of the 
Northern Song (960–1127), whose comments he had collected in his 1172 Lun-Meng jingyi 
論孟精義 , there was certain agreement regarding the interpretation of this passage. 142 
Regarding the “excellent” part of the passage, the commentatorial predecessors agreed 
virtually unanimously on both the supposed historical inevitability of Wu’s recourse to 
violence and the positive value of the new political order he initiated.
143
 It is on this point of 
political merit that both Shun and Wu were “fully excellent”. Regarding the “good” part of 
the passage, the commentators noted that while Wu’s resort to force was deemed to have been 
generally undesirable, certainly when compared to Shun’s non-violent attainment of the realm 
along the ideal of “moral attraction” (see chapter 2), it was not his own moral inadequacy but 
rather the totality of historical developments that had determined his actions. It was warfare in 
                                                            
139 See for example ZZYL, 25.634. 
140 Stroble, “Justification of War,” 171; Wei Cheng-t’ung, “Standard and Expedient,” 265. 
141 SSZJJZ, 68. 
142 ZZQS, 7:130–1. 
143 This point is reflected most clearly in the comments of Cheng Yi, Fan Zuyu, and Xie Liangzuo 謝良佐 
(1050–1103); ZZQS, 7:130. 
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general, but not Wu’s decision to engage in it, that was “not yet fully good” according to the 
early Song commentators.
144
  
While Zhu similarly noted the supposed historical necessity of war in his own 
commentary to Analects 3:25, formally completed five years later in 1177, he departed 
significantly from this commentatorial precedent in his interpretation of what made Wu “not 
yet fully good”. Zhu commented:  
 
Shun succeeded Yao and brought about order, while King Wu attacked Zhòu to rescue 
the people; their merit was one and the same. Therefore, both musical compositions 
were fully excellent. However, whereas Shun exhibited his virtue naturally and 
furthermore obtained the realm through abdication, Wu returned to his virtue [through 
cultivation] and furthermore obtained the realm through punitive war and 
executions.
145
 Therefore, the substance [of their actions] differed. 舜紹堯致治，武王
伐紂救民，其功一也，故其樂皆盡美。然舜之德，性之也，又以揖遜而有天下；
武王之德，反之也，又以征誅而得天下，故其實有不同者.146  
 
In what appears to be a direct reference to Mencius 7B:33, in which Mencius similarly 
compared Shun’s natural exhibition of virtue with Wu’s more forceful efforts at “returning” to 
it, Zhu Xi suggested a rather more critical interpretation of the second phrase of Analects 
3:25.
147
 While he did not go so far as to actually challenge Wu’s claim to sagehood, as Su Shi 
蘇軾 (1037–1101) had done before him partly on the basis of this particular passage,148 the 
wording of Zhu’s final lines suggests he may have observed a causal connection between 
Wu’s supposed inferior moral attainment and his decision to initiate war. The logical flipside 
to this observation, namely that Shun could avoid war because of his naturally perfected 
virtue, was suggested by Zhu to his disciples between 1189 and 1192: “Shun was a sage who 
was ‘born knowing it’. People would turn to his magnificent virtue on their own accord; it 
                                                            
144 See for example the comments by Cheng Yi, Xie Liangzuo, and You Zuo 游酢 (1053–1123); ZZQS, 7:130–1. 
145 It is important to note that, for Zhu Xi, virtue (de 德) as an innate property was synonymous with inborn 
nature (xing). While this innate virtue was readily accessible to Shun, Wu had to engage in thoroughgoing 
cultivation to “return” to it. Cf. ZZYL, 14.260. 
146 SSZJJZ, 68. 
147  SSZJJZ, 373. As elaborated below, the implication is that Wu’s efforts at cultivation were somehow 
incomplete. See WJ, 53.2495–7. 
148 Su Shi 蘇軾, Su Shi wenji 蘇軾文集, ed. Kong Fanli 孔凡禮 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), 5.137–9. Zhu 
challenged Su’s thesis throughout the 1190s. Cf. ZZYL, 35.907–8, 910.   
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was simply not necessary for him to wage punitive expeditions.” 舜是生知之聖，其德盛，
人自歸之，不必征伐耳.149 
It was not until the middle of the 1190s that Zhu gradually moved to nuance his 
position and ultimately disavowed any causal relation between Wu’s being “not yet fully good” 
and the act of (benevolent) military aggression. The primary vehicle for this change was the 
introduction of a frequently recurring, speculative exercise in alternative history, with 
disciples repeatedly asking Zhu what Shun would have done had he been in Wu’s position. 
On the first recorded occasion of this question in 1191, Zhu remained ambiguous.
150
 When 
the same question was put to him again two years later, he stated that King Wen and even the 
venerated Shun himself would have similarly rebelled violently against Zhòu, had they been 
in Wu’s position: “If King Wen had managed to remain until the time of King Wu, and [Zhòu] 
had still not diminished his old habits, he could not but have attacked. Had Shun been there, 
he would similarly have dispatched an expedition.” 若使文王待得到武王時，他那舊習又不
消散，文王也只得伐。舜到這裏也著伐.151 In a development that occurred in tandem with 
Zhu’s gradual reconceptualization of the notion of quan, Zhu increasingly emphasized 
historical circumstance as the main determinant of benevolent martial behavior.
152
 In 1199, he 
furthermore denied any causal link between the sage’s virtue and his decision to wage war: 
“That he was ‘[not yet fully] good’ speaks only of his virtue, something pertaining to Wu’s 
person; it had nothing to do with matters of punitive war.” 善只說德，是武王身上事，不干
征伐事.153 
Having thereby fully embraced the historical approach to Analects 3:25 first advocated 
by his Northern Song predecessors, Zhu Xi’s attention shifted instead to Wu’s particular 
behavior during his campaigns as a possible explanation of what had made him “not yet fully 
good” in the eyes of Confucius. When compared with similar campaigns conducted by Tang, 
as Zhu noted on several occasions, Wu’s conduct was particularly rash or “coarse” (cu 粗).154 
                                                            
149 ZZYL, 25.636. The phrase cited in parentheses refers to Analects 16:9. 
150 ZZYL, 25.637. 
151 ZZYL, 25.634. Zhu expressed a similar belief in an undated letter to Xu Yuanpin. Cf. WJ, 39.1757–8. 
152 In the period between 1196 and 1200, Zhu noted Shun’s possible recourse to warfare on three occasions. Cf. 
ZZYL, 25.636–7. 
153 ZZYL, 25.635–6. Tanaka Kenji has determined that Chen Chun, who recorded this statement, studied under 
Zhu in 1190 as well as in 1199. As several statements recorded between 1189 and 1192 directly contradict this 
quote, I date it to 1199. See Tanaka Kenji, “Shiji nenkō,” 153–8. 
154 In a letter addressed to Liu Jizhang 劉季章, Zhu argued that while both Tang and Wu had similarly “returned 
to their nature” 反性 through forceful effort, as is described in Mencius 7B:33, Wu had been significantly less 
successful in this endeavor. This may explain the difference in their martial conduct. See WJ, 53.2495–7. A 
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Whereas Zhu had still claimed in his 1177 commentary that both Tang and Wu had “felt 
shame because of their [momentarily lacking] virtue” 有慚德 , statements dated to 1199 
suggest he had started to doubt the extent to which Wu was indeed capable of such self-
reflection.
155
 Perhaps most telling was the way Tang and Wu had concluded their campaigns: 
whereas Tang had simply banished Jie, Wu instead chose to personally decapitate Zhòu and 
hang his head from a pole.
156
 
 At this point one must be careful not to overstate the severity of Zhu’s criticism. After 
all, he himself had expressed a similar wish regarding the head of the Jurchen chief sometime 
between 1189 and 1192.
157
 More to the point, Zhu stated explicitly on several occasions that 
Wu’s rashness ultimately did not detract from his status as a sage (shengren).158 Far more 
significant is the observation that Zhu’s eventual preoccupation with these details indicates 
his underlying acceptance of warfare as a historical necessity. While this position can already 
be partly identified in his 1177 commentary to Analects 3:25, it was not until the 1190s that 
Zhu Xi could fully embrace the positive evaluation of Wu’s military actions as it was shared 
among his Northern Song predecessors, concurrent with his gradual reconceptualization of the 
“expedient”. 
 
Conclusion 
Building on the simultaneously transcendental and immanental nature of his ethical 
framework, Zhu Xi increasingly allowed for the historicization and contextualization of moral 
judgment. While he had already encouraged the recently enthroned Xiaozong in the 1160s to 
devote his studies to Principle so that he may respond correctly to the “endless changes of the 
age”, undoubtedly referring to his own subsequent case for war against the Jurchen, it was not 
until the 1190s that he started to explicitly associate his emergent terminology of jing and 
quan with matters of warfare. This development coincided with his gradual rejection of 
Cheng Yi’s conceptualization of quan, which he ultimately dismissed as being too rigid, in 
favor of the Han position. Indicative of these developments was his changing assessment of 
the sagely Wu, whose military endeavors he ultimately moved to thoroughly contextualize 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
record of similarly addressed letters in the Zhu Xi nianpu suggests a dating between 1195 and 1200. See ZXNP, 
457–70. 
155 SSZJJZ, 68; ZZYL, 61.1474. 
156 Zhu cited this behavior as a reflection of Wu’s “not yet fully good” moral constitution on several occasions 
between 1193 and 1199. See ZZYL, 35.907, 61.1474. 
157 ZZYL, 133.3200. 
158 He mostly did so in response to Su Shi, who had argued the opposite. ZZYL, 35.907–8, 910.   
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and, in 1199, even completely divorced from any personal moral flaws he may have had. 
Provided one had a sagely insight into the normative strictures of Principle, recourse to 
warfare was the product of historical circumstance, not moral deficiency. 
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4. Zhu Xi’s Case for War 
The present chapter marks my turn to Zhu Xi’s thought on the concrete military issues facing 
the Song, focusing on his participation in the war and peace debate at court. As he himself 
described it, participants within the strategic debate favored either an indefinite peace accord 
(he 和), short-term military offensive (zhan 戰), or a more protracted preparatory defense 
(shou 守).159 Whereas the difference between the latter two positions was mostly a matter of 
military strategy, Zhu’s lifelong opposition to the signing of peace treaties with the Jurchen 
had a thoroughly philosophical foundation. In the first section, I examine Zhu Xi’s first 
official articulation of his case against peace, presented to the throne in 1162, focusing on his 
argumentation for the paired goals of recovering the northern Central Plains (huifu zhongyuan 
恢復中原) and taking revenge against the Jurchen (fuchou 復讎). In the second section, I 
examine Zhu’s subsequent encounter with Emperor Xiaozong in 1163, focusing on his 
evolving conceptualization of the nature of revanchist sentiment. Continuing upon this 
conceptual scaffolding in the third section, I challenge the recently held claim that Zhu Xi 
supposedly abandoned revenge as a legitimate argument for war from the 1180s onward, 
demonstrating that he maintained this cause unabatedly. 
 
4.1 “Enemies of our father” 
Following its crushing defeat at the hands of Jurchen forces during the 1127 “Disaster of 
Jingkang” 靖康之禍 , the Song court relocated its capital to the south, where Emperor 
Gaozong 宋高宗 eventually ordered the initiation of peace negotiations in December 1138.160 
As Tao Jing-shen has pointed out, an important common thread uniting the immediate 
opposition against these negotiations was the traditional injunction against “sharing the same 
skies as an enemy [who had killed] one’s father” 父之讎弗與共戴天, cited from the Record 
of Ritual (Liji 禮記).161 One record in the History of the Song (Songshi 宋史) has named Zhu 
Xi’s own father, Zhu Song 朱松 (1097–1143), as a cosigner of the memorial submitted in 
                                                            
159 See for example WJ, 13.633. Huang Kuanchong 黃寬重 has described these positions as the three legs of the 
“tripod” 鼎 of Southern Song strategic debate. See Huang Kuanchong 黃寬重, Wansong chaochen dui guoshi de 
zhengyi 晚宋朝臣對國是的爭議 (Taipei: Guoli Taiwan daxue wenshi zongkan, 1978), 71. 
160 Tuotuo 脫脫, ed., Songshi 宋史 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977), 29.537. Hereafter SS. 
161 Tao Jing-shen, “The Move to the South and the Reign of Kao-tsung (1127–1162),” in Cambridge History of 
China, vol. 5, pt. 1, The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors, 907–1279, ed. Denis Twitchett and Paul Jakov Smith 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 678. For the Liji source, see Sun Xidan 孫希旦, ed., Liji jijie 
禮記集解 (Taipei: Wenshizhe chubanshe, 1990), 4.87. 
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protest against the negotiations, suggesting a concrete link between this early appeal to 
canonical justification and the later foundation of Zhu Xi’s own case against peace. 162 
Although Zhu Xi himself would later recollect, undoubtedly with some exaggeration, that 
“Everyone, regardless of wisdom or status, unequivocally agreed [these negotiations] were 
unacceptable” 天下之人，無賢愚，無貴賤，交口合辭以為不可,163 peace was established 
and maintained without significant incident for two decades. When in 1161 Jin prince 
Wanyan Liang 完顏亮 led an abortive incursion into Song territory, the war and peace debate 
reignited at court.  
Immediately following the abdication of Gaozong in July 1162, his successor 
Xiaozong issued a public decree calling for ‘forthright counsel’ (zhiyan 直言).164 Two months 
later, Zhu Xi submitted his memorial to the throne.
165
 The content of this memorial has 
previously been analyzed by several scholars, who have unanimously described a high degree 
of argumentative continuity with Zhu’s second memorial, presented the following year in 
1163.
166
 However, as I will argue below, several differences between the two writings 
indicate a gradual shift in Zhu’s argumentation. This development will prove particularly 
significant for our analysis of the development of his argumentation following the 1160s, 
discussed in the next section. 
In his first memorial in 1162, Zhu based himself on the notion of Principle to reiterate 
the same canonical justification for war his father had maintained before him. While he 
pointed to both irredentism (huifu) and revanchism (fuchou) as legitimate cases for war, his 
focus lay virtually exclusively on the latter:  
 
To us, the Jin caitiffs are “enemies one may not share the same skies with”, enemies 
we may not make peace with; the moral Principle of this case is clear. […] What is 
meant with “to insist on peace” has a hundred disadvantages and not a single benefit, 
so what kind of hardship could justify it? Now, the notions “taking revenge on 
enemies and punishing wrongdoers” and “strengthening yourself and doing good” 
appear in the Classics, and they are exceedingly clear. 夫金虜於我有不共戴天之讎，
                                                            
162 SS, 473.13754. 
163 WJ, 75.3618. 
164 SS, 33.617. 
165 For precise dating, see ZXNP, 20. 
166 Tilllman, Utilitarian Confucianism, 175–6; Zhu Ruixi, “Touxiangpai?”, 72–4; Li Longxian, Fuchouguan, 72–
3. 
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則其不可和也，義理明矣 […] 所謂講和者，有百害無一利，何苦而必為之？夫
復讎討賊、自彊為善之說見於經者，不啻詳矣.167 
 
Contrary to what Zhu’s final statement suggests, his argumentation did not move beyond 
normative assertions at this point in time. As noted earlier, the phrase “an enemy one may not 
share the same skies with” 不共戴天之讎 is an abbreviated reference to the Liji, originally 
referring specifically to the murderer of one’s father.168 As the commentator Zheng Xuan 鄭
玄 (127–200) had noted, “A father is his son’s ‘Heaven’. If the son [is willing to] live under 
the same skies as the person who killed this ‘Heaven’, he is no filial son.” 父者子之天，殺己
之天，與共戴天，非孝子也.169 Zhu’s subsequent phrase “taking revenge on enemies and 
punishing wrongdoers” 復讎討賊 appears to refer to another of the Classics, namely the 
Gongyang Commentary to the Spring and Autumn Annals 春秋公羊傳: “The minister who 
does not punish wrongdoers, is not a true minister; the son who does not avenge [his father], 
is not a true son.” 臣不討賊，非臣也。子不復讎，非子也.170 The normative claims about 
the “true son” and his filial duty to pursue revenge suggest a decidedly familial 
conceptualization of revenge, at least in its explicit articulation. 
 Regarding the issue of recovery (huifu) as a case for war, Zhu remained substantially 
less articulate, possibly suggesting he considered the legitimacy of this cause self-evident. 
Contrasting strongly with contemporaries such as Chen Liang 陳亮  (1143‒1194), who 
utilized elaborate geomantic and cosmological theories to argue for the necessity of 
recovering the north,
171
 Zhu simply juxtaposed his aim to “recover the Central Plains” with 
the need to “repel the barbarians” 攘夷狄 without further elaboration.172 As I noted in chapter 
2, Zhu would eventually connect these aims to what he considered the main tenets of the 
Annals, namely “To keep the Chinese states as internal and the barbarians as external.” 內諸
                                                            
167 WJ, 11.573. 
168 It appears Zhu used the character chou 仇 and its variant chou 讎 interchangeably, both meaning “enemy” or 
“enmity”. 
169 Sun Xidan, Liji, 4.87. 
170 He Xiu 何休 and Xu Yan 徐彦, Chunqiu gongyangzhuan zhushu 春秋公羊傳註疏, ed. Li Xueqin 李學勤 
(Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 1999), 3.65. 
171 See Tillman, “Proto-Nationalism,” 406–12; and Tillman, Utilitarian Confucianism, 172–5. 
172 WJ, 11.573, 576. 
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夏，外夷狄.173 However, this ethnocentric case against peace with the Jurchen remained 
mostly implicit throughout Zhu’s official communications at court. 
In sum, during his first formal encounter with Xiaozong, Zhu’s most explicit focus lay 
on the supposed connection between Principle and an apparently related pair of normative 
claims regarding the “true son” and “true minister” to plead against peace with the Jurchen. 
While the relation remained implicit and unelaborated, his direct reference to the Liji 
injunction suggests he was chiefly concerned with the filial duty of the “true son” at this point 
in time. 
 
4.2 “Enemies of our lord” 
The historical records indicate that Zhu Xi and his fellow anti-peace advocates initially 
succeeded in convincing Xiaozong. In June 1163, Song general Zhang Jun 張浚 crossed the 
Yangzi river to rally his troops. After an initial string of victories, however, the Song army 
suffered a devastating defeat at Fuli 符離 several weeks later, and no more subsequent Song 
victories were reported.
174
 Peace negotiations commenced soon afterwards. Although 
negotiations would eventually bog down over several disagreements, Xiaozong’s concession 
of “four prefectures and an annual payment in coin” to the Jin in October 1163 indicates he 
had set his sights on peace.
175
 
One month later, Zhu Xi presented his second memorial, consisting of three short texts, 
to the throne.
176
 In the second text he restated his case against peace with the Jurchen, this 
time in considerably more explicit terms. Following an extensive discussion of the necessity 
of self-cultivation and the investigation of Principle, he pointed to the particular Principle he 
had in mind: 
 
Benevolence is nowhere greater than between father and son, and righteousness is 
nowhere greater than between lord and minister. This is what is called “the essence of 
the three guiding principles” and the “root of the five constants”.177 They are the apex 
of the Heavenly Principle of human relations, and nothing between Heaven and earth 
                                                            
173 ZZYL, 83.2173. 
174 SS, 33.622–3. 
175 SS, 33.624. 
176 ZXNP, 22. 
177 The “three guiding principles” 三綱 refer to the relations between lord-subject, father-son, and husband-wife. 
The “five constants” 五常 refer to the virtues of benevolence (ren), rightness (yi), ritual propriety (li), wisdom 
(zhi), and trustworthiness (xin). 
46 
 
escapes their influence. It is said that “one may not live under the same Heaven as the 
enemy of one’s lord or one’s father,” which relates to all that is covered by Heaven 
above and supported by the earth below. 仁莫大於父子，義莫大於君臣，是謂三綱
之要、五常之本、人倫天理之至，無所逃於天地之間。其曰君父之讎不與共戴
天者，乃天之所覆、地之所戴.178 
 
The canonical foundation of Zhu’s argument, namely that one may not share the same skies as 
one’s father’s enemy, is again cited from the Liji, but with one substantial modification: 
instead of the “enemy of one’s father” 父之讎, Zhu now pointed to the “enemy of one’s lord 
or one’s father” 君父之讎. In effect, Zhu enlarged the scope of a moral norm traditionally 
confined to family affairs, gradually extending its application to the sovereign and, more 
concretely, his military policy. As Conrad Schirokauer has pointed out, Zhu discerned a 
particularly strong correlation between the traditional bonds of respectively lord-minister and 
father-son, to the point that “there is no difference between the political and familial 
relationship.”179 However, while this connection had remained implicit in the 1162 memorial, 
through the simple juxtaposition of the son’s duty to “take revenge” with the minister’s task to 
“punish wrongdoers”, it became explicit in 1163. 180  Furthermore, Zhu concluded the 
argumentative portion of his memorial by relating these observations directly to the notion of 
inborn nature (xing), indicating he traced the desire to avenge one’s lord to Principle itself.181 
 Besides revealing an apparent argumentative shift in Zhu Xi’s thought, the 
increasingly explicit nature of his argumentation may furthermore indicate a mounting sense 
of urgency and perhaps even frustration on his part, as he witnessed Xiaozong’s abrupt 
abandonment of his earlier pro-war fervor after the defeat at Fuli. As he would note in the 
1180s: “Initially, the Emperor was keenly motivated to recover [the Central Plains], but at the 
defeat at Fuli he became grief-stricken.” 上初恢復之志甚銳，及符離之敗，上方大慟.182 
Similarly, in a letter addressed to Wei Yuanlü 魏元履 shortly after the 1163 encounter with 
Xiaozong, Zhu voiced his desperation: “The peace treaty has already been settled; evil 
theories rush about in a great torrent. This is not something that can be ‘crossed by a single 
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reed’.” 和議已決，邪說橫流，非一葦可杭 . 183  It is likely that Zhu Xi restated his 
argumentation partly in response to Xiaozong’s expanding support for the peace initiative, as 
it rendered a short-term reformulation of military policy increasingly unlikely.  
In sum, while Zhu’s 1162 and 1163 memorials indeed demonstrate a certain degree of 
thematic unity, one can simultaneously observe a distinct shift in both tone and content, 
resulting in an increasingly explicit, political formulation of the revanchist cause. In the next 
section, I will challenge recent claims that Zhu Xi eventually abandoned this line of 
argumentation through the 1180s, arguing that it was precisely his gradual reconceptualization 
of Jurchen enmity that enabled him to maintain this argument for the remainder of his 
political life. 
 
4.3 Zhu Xi’s enduring case 
There is a general consensus throughout recent literature that Zhu gradually abandoned the 
moral revanchist cause from the 1180s onward, shifting his focus entirely to the irredentist 
aim of recovery (huifu). Two matters in particular are usually taken together to illustrate this 
development: firstly, the supposedly decreased significance or, according to some, complete 
absence of revenge-related themes in Zhu’s 1188 Sealed Memorial Presented in Year Wushen 
(Wushen fengshi 戊申封事);184 secondly, the 1198 statement, recorded in the Yulei, that 
avenging one’s father had ceased to be a valid reason for war as too much time had elapsed.185 
These claims are difficult to reconcile with the observation that, throughout the 1180s and 
‘90s, Zhu actually repeatedly stressed the moral importance of revenge.186 To address this 
apparent contradiction, I shall first examine how his line of moral argumentation developed 
following his 1163 audience. 
Undoubtedly incensed by the public announcement that peace negotiations with the 
Jurchen had been concluded in January 1165,
187
 Zhu reaffirmed his commitment to the 
revanchist cause on several occasions throughout the later 1160s. Explaining the perceived 
demerits of the recent “talk of peace” (jianghe 講和) at court in an 1165 letter addressed to 
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Chen Junqing, he claimed that “even for ten thousand generations, ministers and sons will 
remember and repay the enemies of our ancestors.” 祖宗之讎，萬世臣子之所必報而不
忘.188 On another occasion that same year, writing in his Preface to the Forthright Opinions 
of Year Wuwu [1138] (Wuwu dangyixu 戊午讜議序),189 Zhu criticized certain individuals 
who had insisted on an upper time limit of five generations for revenge, arguing that such 
strictures applied only to commoners.
190
 He concluded: “One who possesses all-under-Heaven 
continues an endless succession covering ten thousand generations, so ten thousand 
generations may necessarily avenge him.” 若夫有天下者，承萬世無疆之統，則亦有萬世
必報之讎.191 Whereas throughout the early 1160s Zhu had simply juxtaposed the duty to 
avenge one’s father with the duty to avenge one’s lord, these subsequent comments suggest 
his focus had shifted to the sovereign as the primary locus of revanchist sentiment. 
Furthermore, this emphasis on the sovereign as the determinant of revanchist legitimacy 
displays a close correlation with Zhu’s eventual conceptualization of warfare as the sole 
prerogative of the Son of Heaven, expressed in his 1177 Analects and Mencius commentaries 
and described previously in chapter 2, suggestive of a close conceptual relationship. 
One common thread among Zhu’s subsequent discussions of the revanchist cause 
throughout the 1170s and 1180s was his explicit identification of the state (guo 國 or guojia 
國家),192 as opposed to any individual “father”, as the historical recipient of Jurchen violence. 
In two 1178 stele inscriptions devoted to Liu Gong 劉珙 (1122‒1178), who had supported 
Zhu’s views on the Jin, Zhu noted the importance of “repaying for the state the disgrace 
caused by our enemies.” 為國家報雪讎恥.193 Similarly, in a later poem composed in memory 
of Liu, Zhu noted that “the disgrace caused by the enemies of the state has not yet been set 
right.” 國家讎恥未雪.194 The state represented the most tangible connecting element between 
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successive sovereigns, and, as Conrad Schirokauer has pointed out, Zhu made no significant 
distinction between the state and the sovereign as foci of loyalty.
195
 Particularly striking is the 
concurrence of this development with the formative period of Zhu’s Analects and Mencius 
commentaries, in which, as I have argued previously in chapters 1 and 2, he explicitly 
conceptualized warfare as a legitimate activity exclusive to the state. More salient for our 
present purposes is the implication that, as long as the state persisted, past enmity could serve 
to legitimize future military response, even when the actual perpetrators of the historical 
crime were long dead and no direct sons of “murdered fathers” remained. 
At this point I may address two particular textual records cited among recent 
scholarship as evidence for Zhu’s supposed rejection of the revanchist cause. Firstly, Zhu Xi’s 
1188 Sealed Memorial has recently been interpreted as marking either his decreased interest 
in or even total abandonment of the belief that revenge was a legitimate motivation for war.
196
 
Perhaps most remarkable is the recent claim by Li Longxian 李隆献 that the issue of revenge 
played no role whatsoever throughout the memorial.
197
 On the contrary, while Zhu indeed 
dedicated most of the text to a practical discussion of several economic and military policies, 
his concluding remarks indicate that the ultimate aim of these initiatives was precisely to 
wreak vengeance and to change the fact that “the enemy caitiffs had not yet been annihilated” 
仇虜不滅.198 In another series of memorials presented to Xiaozong that same year, Zhu stated 
his case even more explicitly. Addressing the Emperor directly, he affirmed his belief in 
revenge in the form of a carefully packaged accusation: “It is not that you do not desire to 
repay the disgrace brought upon the royal ancestral temple, yet sometimes you could not 
avoid [falling for] cowardly and short-sighed schemes [of peace].” 非不欲報復陵廟之仇耻，
而或不免於畏怯苟安之計.199 Zhu Xi’s use of the “royal ancestral temple” (lingmiao 陵廟), 
possibly referring to Xiaozong’s recently deceased predecessor Gaozong, 200  furthermore 
reaffirms my observation that he had shifted his attention to the sovereign and, by extension, 
the state itself as the primary focus of revanchist sentiment. 
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The second piece of textual evidence repeatedly cited to prove Zhu’s supposed 
abandonment of revanchism is a single record in the Yulei in which Zhu discussed the 
maximum timeframe for revenge, particularly against the murderer of one’s father, dated 
between 1198 and 1200.
201
 Repeatedly stressing the necessity to take revenge as soon as 
circumstances allowed, mainly to prevent the gradual cooling of one’s sentiments, Zhu indeed 
stated that timeframes of nine and even one hundred generations specified in the Chunqiu 
commentaries were “nonsensical theories” 亂說.202 As such, he remarked, it would have been 
best had the Jurchen been repaid in the early years of Gaozong’s reign, when the turmoil of 
1127 was still fresh on the minds of those involved. As most direct victims and perpetrators of 
the incursion were dead by the late 1190s, sentiments had cooled and, perhaps more 
importantly, the current generation of Jurchen bore no direct guilt of the incident. Furthermore, 
Zhu stated, the revanchist cause had been taken up by certain opportunist career officials to 
further their own schemes, to the extent that “upright men and proper scholars had come to 
reject revanchism and approved of peace negotiations.” 端人正士者，又以復讎為非，和議
為是.203 Those who advocated a short-term offensive against the Jin at this point in time, he 
lamented, did so only to the detriment of the dynasty. 
However, despite these considerations and contrary to recent claims cited above, Zhu 
did not in fact explicitly reject revanchism at any point throughout this Yulei record. 
Furthermore, whereas the discussion focused primarily on the legitimacy of avenging one’s 
father, I have noted previously that, as early as the 1170s, Zhu had shifted his attention to the 
sovereign and the enduring dynasty itself as primary loci for Song revanchist sentiment. 
Accordingly, directly following his denunciation of certain timeframes as “nonsensical 
theories”, Zhu noted a crucial caveat: “These matters are multifarious. The matter of avenging 
sovereign and state is also different [from avenging one’s father].” 事也多樣。國君復讎之
事又不同.204 In this light, it appears that Zhu denounced solely the legitimacy of avenging 
one’s father as a case for war by the late 1190s; avenging one’s sovereign and the Song state 
remained on the table. 
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Accordingly, several records dated to the same period between 1198 and 1200 have 
Zhu consistently affirm the revanchist cause, consistently paired with the necessity to 
eventually “recover the Central Plains”. At one such point, he summarized his case: “The 
grand essence of our state in the south-east consists precisely of recovering the Central Plains 
and erasing the disgrace caused by our enemies.” 國於東南，所謂大體者，正在於復中原，
雪讎恥.205 Zhu’s use of the term “grand essence”, subsequently described as “what should be 
done according to the Principle of the matter” 事理當合做處,206 indicates that the moral 
legitimacy of revenge on the Jurchen barbarians remained guaranteed by Principle itself. 
Furthermore, his consistent pairing of revenge as a moral argument for war with the aim of 
recovering the northern plains demonstrates that the two goals remained inextricably 
related.
207
 
 
Conclusion 
While Zhu Xi initially focused chiefly on the Principle-determined moral duty to take revenge 
against the “enemies of one’s slain father”, it appears that several historical developments 
caused him to gradually shift his attention to the sovereign and, by extension, the state itself 
as the primary foci of revanchist sentiments. This gradual process of conceptual development, 
stretching from 1163 into the late 1180s, ensured that Zhu could maintain revenge as a 
legitimate case for war alongside the irredentist aim of recovering the Central Plains, as the 
“grand essence” of the Song state as it persisted in the south-east. At the same time, however, 
it appears that factors such as the particularly hostile political climate towards the end of Zhu 
Xi’s career served to influence his attitudes to a certain extent, to the point that he ended up 
viewing pro-war elements at court with a large degree of suspicion, despite his fundamental 
opposition to the peace treaty with the Jurchen Jin. While this did not significantly diminish 
his position on revanchism, I shall argue in the following chapter that it did determine his 
views on the other two major positions in the court debate, namely those of zhan and shou. 
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5. The Strategic Debate 
Although Zhu Xi was fundamentally opposed to an indefinite peace accord (he) with the Jin, 
this should not be taken to imply he supported an immediate offensive (zhan) with similar 
fervor. The aim of the current chapter is to determine the precise measure between the latter 
type of “hawkish” aggressiveness and a more defensive attitude (shou) within Zhu’s proposals. 
In the first section, through a close discussion of his 1162 memorial within its historical and 
argumentative context, I challenge recent claims regarding Zhu’s supposed “hawkish” support 
for an immediate offensive in the early years of his political life. In the second section, I 
assess the subsequent development of Zhu’s position, demonstrating that persistent political 
and institutional impediments to military preparation, internal to the functioning of the Song 
dynasty itself, motivated him to maintain and reinforce his defensive attitude. In the third 
section, I shift my attention to factors external to the dynasty, focusing specifically on the 
perceived barbarian nature of the Jurchen Jin and its influence on Zhu’s position, ultimately 
informing his rejection of both he and zhan as acceptable positions within the debate. 
 
5.1 Initial positioning: reassessing Zhu’s “hawkishness” 
Recent scholarship has yielded two competing descriptions of Zhu’s career as an anti-peace 
activist. Firstly, based on the comparatively aggressive style of moral argumentation found in 
his first memorial presented in 1162, it has been argued by Qian Mu (in 1971), Zhu Ruixi 朱
瑞熙 (in 1978), and Hoyt Tillman (in 1982) that Zhu Xi “hawkishly” supported an immediate 
offensive against the Jin in the early 1160s, gradually shifting his focus to long-term defensive 
preparation over subsequent decades.
208
 The most immediate cause for this change, it is 
claimed, was the 1163 Song defeat at Fuli, which had supposedly laid bare Song military 
weakness. Secondly, the analyses of Brian McKnight (in 1986) and Zhou Chaxian 周茶仙 (in 
1999) instead suggest a much greater degree of continuity in Zhu Xi’s support of preparatory 
defense.
209
 Not coincidentally, the latter two discussions do not address his rather “hawkish” 
1162 memorial. As I shall demonstrate below, several comments made throughout this first 
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public statement indeed suggest a hawkish case for war. Several other statements, however, 
instead indicate a much more preparatory attitude. To address this apparent contrast, I shall 
first discuss the 1162 memorial in closer detail. 
Perhaps most suggestive of a “hawkish” attitude is the sheer amount of attention Zhu 
devoted to his moral case against peace with the Jurchen in 1162. As I observed in chapter 4, 
he argued that Principle itself determined the necessity of “avenging slain fathers” and 
“repelling the barbarians”. 210  Furthermore, he insisted that one of the main arguments 
supposedly put forth by advocates of peace negotiations, namely that the Song military was 
not up to the task, was fundamentally unacceptable.
211
 In this light, it is indeed easy to see 
how his attitude could be considered “hawkish”. However, several other statements contradict 
this interpretation. Firstly, emphasizing the disastrous influence peace negotiations 
supposedly had on Song offensive capabilities, Zhu conceded that “strategic dispositions have 
not been brought to fruition; advancing forward, we cannot strike; falling back, we cannot 
hold.” 形勢未成，進不能攻，退不能守 .212 At another point, he noted that only “after 
several years [of preparations], when our determination is settled and our energies are filled to 
satiation, our state will be wealthy and the military powerful.” 數年之外，志定氣飽，國富
兵強.213 In the first analysis, Zhu’s approach of lamenting Song military weakness while 
simultaneously condemning peace advocates for adopting this same argument appears 
contradictory. I shall address this contrast further below, following a closer examination of his 
claims. 
The implication underlying Zhu’s statements, namely that the Song military was 
unprepared for an immediate counteroffensive during the early 1160s, is corroborated by 
several recent examinations. Peter Lorge has indicated that, while the Song navy had managed 
to fend off the 1161 invasion led by Jurchen prince Wanyan Liang, the infantry and cavalry 
necessary for a counterattack had yet to be prepared several months earlier.
214
 Recurrent 
reports of an imminent Jurchen incursion had been ignored by Emperor Gaozong, who instead 
insisted on the 1141 peace treaty as a guarantee of security until the final months before the 
invasion.
215
 Zhu Xi’s prior awareness of these structural weaknesses is strongly reflected in 
his letter to Huang Zushun 黃祖舜  (1100–1165), sent shortly after the assassination of 
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Wanyan Liang in December 1161. After initially expressing his delight with the death of the 
Jurchen leader, he pointed to long-standing military neglect, coinciding with the duration of 
the 1141 peace treaty, as an obstacle impeding further action: “For twenty-odd years, 
government policy has been unprincipled, military preparations have been neglected, and the 
power of our state has been weak.” 二十餘年，朝政不綱，兵備弛廢，國勢衰弱.216 While 
Zhu supported an eventual counterattack against the Jin, it appears he considered an 
immediate offensive unfeasible. He concluded: “If we conscript troops now, they will be 
weak and useless; if we are about to contend with [the Jin] for the Central Plains, we will be 
unfamiliar with its tactical dispositions.” 募兵則兵脆弱而無用；將據中原而與之爭，則形
勢未習.217 Clear parallels between these private comments and the reservations Zhu would 
express publicly several months later in 1162 indicate that his pessimism regarding Song 
military capability was persistent.  
However, this does not yet fully explain why he was so adamantly opposed to the 
peace agreement, even as a temporary measure. While the 1141 treaty admittedly introduced a 
significant fiscal burden and placed restrictions on the amount of border garrisons the Song 
could maintain,
218
 it is not altogether clear whether these strictures would have completely 
obstructed any and all covert offensive preparations. 
In Zhu’s view, however, the concurrence of the 1141 Jin-Song peace treaty with the 
perceived onset of Song military dilapidation was not coincidental. Throughout his political 
career, he pointed to “talk of peace” (jianghe 講和) as the root cause of Song weakness. He 
emphasized the debilitating effects of pro-peace efforts throughout his 1162 memorial, at one 
point stating unambiguously that “What is meant by ‘talk of peace’ has a hundred 
disadvantages and not a single benefit, so what kind of hardship could possibly necessitate it?” 
所謂講和者，有百害無一利，何苦而必為之.219 Similarly, as he stated to his students in 
the 1180s, “Throughout our dynasty, the military has been wrecked by the word ‘peace’.” 本
朝禦戎，始終為和字壞.220 Besides indicating his fundamental opposition to peace, these 
remarks furthermore suggest a reference to the institutional power wielded by the small group 
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of “court favorites” 近習之臣 who initially championed the peace discourse at court.221 As 
Zhang Weiling 張維玲  has pointed out, pro-peace court favorites (jinxi 近習) close to 
Gaozong and his successor Xiaozong often held positions with substantial influence over the 
military and had even actively delayed the initiation of preparatory measures against Jurchen 
incursion.
222
 Zhu Xi himself noted in his biography of the famed general Zhang Jun that peace 
advocates had deliberately worked to sabotage defensive garrisons in an attempt to persuade 
Xiaozong of the necessity to make peace.
223
 Regardless of the truthfulness of these claims, it 
is clear that Zhu considered the peace accord, or rather its advocates, to constitute a structural 
impediment to military readiness. 
In sum, if Zhu was at all hawkish in the initial stages of his public career, this was 
certainly not to plead for an immediate offensive (zhan). Instead, while he might have been 
cautiously optimistic regarding Xiaozong’s initial desire to “avenge slain fathers” and “retake 
the Central Plains”, 224  he had emphasized the need for “several years” of defensive 
preparations as early as 1162. The 1163 defeat at Fuli, however devastating, did not represent 
a pivotal moment for Zhu in this regard. As I shall demonstrate in the following section, he 
maintained this attitude for the remainder of his political life. 
 
5.2 Enduring defensiveness 
In chapter 4 I suggested that, while Zhu Xi’s underlying revanchist motivations remained 
consistent throughout his career, the 1163 defeat at Fuli stimulated him to formulate his moral 
case for war in increasingly explicit terms. Similarly, whereas in 1162 he focused primarily 
on the strategic demerits of peace agreements, with the result that his preparatory posture 
remained largely implicit, this stance became explicit in 1163. Zhu explained his long-term 
strategic view: 
 
We should combine offense (zhan) and defense (shou) into a single strategy. This 
ensures that, as our defenses are firm, we possess the means for waging an offensive; 
as our offensive is successful, we possess the means to defend. One engenders the 
other, as a circle without end, maintained year after year, month after month. 合戰守
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之計以為一，使守固而有以戰，戰勝而有以守，奇正相生，如環之無端，持以
歲月.225 
 
The emphasis on the gradual yet determined nature of this approach is striking. In another 
segment of the memorial, Zhu explained the rationale behind his combination of shou and 
zhan: “The strength of an offensive lies in a sincere advance to seize [the objective], but it 
suffers from reckless action. The art of the defensive lies in firm self-strengthening, but it 
carries the difficulty of prolonged [stand-off].” 戰，誠進取之勢，而亦有輕舉之失。守，
固自治之術，而亦有持久之難.226 As Zhu Ruixi has similarly argued, it is plausible that the 
warning against “reckless action” here referred directly to the failed counterattack into 
Jurchen territory led by Zhang Jun in 1163, several months prior to Zhu’s writing.227 If so, the 
clear parallels between this condemnation of rash action and his persistently negative 
appraisal of Song military strength, dating back to 1161, suggest that he may have indeed 
opposed this campaign even before it happened. 
This would furthermore serve to nuance the view, proposed by Qian Mu and Tillman, 
that Zhu Xi had viewed the early 1160s as a “missed chance” for revenge. In this 
interpretation, the period between Wanyan Liang’s assassination in 1161 and the Fuli defeat 
in 1163 had presented an “opportunity for a quick victory”.228 Several decades later, he indeed 
noted that “If the state had undertaken great action, it would have required only 150.000 crack 
troops [in 1161].” 國家若大舉，只用十五萬精兵.229 However, other comments suggest that 
he actually had a considerably more long-term understanding of what constituted “great 
action” than Qian and Tillman suggest. Discussing Song military policy between the 1141 
peace treaty and the 1161 invasion, Zhu explained: “Dissolutely they prepared not even the 
slightest strategy. Had they prudently worked on self-strengthening during the peace, then 
[Wanyan] Liang’s upheaval would have constituted a grand chance to retake the Central 
Plains in one swoop.” 蕩不為一毫計。使其和中自治有策，後當逆亮之亂，一掃而復中
原，一大機會也.230 It was not a momentary lapse of political initiative but rather long-
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standing neglect that had caused the Song to miss this “chance” for victory, at least in Zhu’s 
analysis. Put simply, the war had been lost before it even started. 
As long as the perceived root cause of Song weakness persisted, namely the “talk of 
peace” combined with the institutional and military authority of its advocates, Zhu maintained 
his opposition to immediate action. Writing to his frequent correspondent Chen Junqing 陳俊
卿  in 1165, he lamented: “Now, ‘talk of peace’ has blocked our state’s grand plan for 
recovery; ‘talk of peace’ has destroyed the practices of our border defenses.” 夫沮國家恢復
之大計者，講和之說也；壞邊陲備禦之常規者，講和之說也.231 Pacifism, Zhu concluded, 
had come to fully dominate state discourse (conventionally termed guoshi 國是).232 In an 
1170 letter addressed to Zhang Shi 張栻 (1133–1181), son of famed general Zhang Jun, he 
again emphasized the need for several years of comprehensive military restructuring. 
Invoking Mencius 4A:7 to illustrate his point, he noted that the required amount of time 
depended on the extent of dilapidation, “Just like Mencius had spoken of five years for a great 
state, seven years for a small one.” 若孟子大國五年、小國七年之說.233 Supposedly pro-
peace court favorites maintained their authority over military affairs throughout subsequent 
decades.
234
 As consequently no significant progress was made in the restoration effort, at least 
in Zhu’s estimation, he repeatedly adjusted his preparatory timeframe, from “more than ten 
years” 十餘年 of required preparation in 1180 to a “maximum of thirty years” 多做三十年 in 
the 1190s.
235
 One important example of the perceived influence of the court favorites was 
their authority over military appointments throughout the 1170s and early 1180s, which had 
allegedly led to widespread bribery in the sale of military posts.
236
 I will discuss these 
particular issues in the following chapter. For now, it suffices to note that according to Zhu Xi, 
the dynasty remained structurally weakened and the task of recovery had to be postponed. 
In sum, both private and public statements made by Zhu Xi regarding the Jin-Song 
conflict indicate a greater degree of consistency than has hitherto been described. When 
placed in its historical and argumentative context, the 1162 memorial conveys a markedly 
defensive and preparatory message, despite its aggressive style of moral argumentation. This 
defensive attitude would only intensify through later decades. His practically-oriented concern 
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with the concrete military capabilities of the Song reminds strongly of a similar concern 
expressed in his 1177 interlinear commentaries. As I noted in chapter 1, he approached the 
topic of concrete military preparation in the Analects and Mencius as a legitimate and 
indispensable government activity, essential for the maintenance of popular trust and a strong 
state. Having observed the Jurchen onslaught in 1161, Zhu Xi’s recommendations to 
Xiaozong echoed the Analects dictum of “ensuring sufficient weaponry” 足兵 as an essential 
part of benevolent statecraft.
237
  
Furthermore, these observations reflect strongly my findings in chapters 2 and 3, 
where I noted that Zhu Xi’s moral approach to warfare was deeply sensitive to the demands of 
historical circumstance. Although he attached absolute, Principle-determined importance to 
avenging one’s father and the Song state itself, this certainly did not mean that one should 
plunge oneself into battle recklessly, just as he conceded the possibility that even Confucius 
had deliberated on military strategy as a “secondary matter” 餘事 in the context of Analects 
14:22. After all, “Whenever the Sage handled affairs, it was not that he only understood moral 
Principle and did not inquire at all into the [practical] merits and demerits of the case; 
something has to be actually feasible for one to accomplish it.” 聖人舉事，也不會只理會義
理，都不問些利害，事也須是可行方得 .238  It is plausible that Zhu’s early anti-peace 
activism informed the practical and historicized approach that characterized his discussion of 
military affairs in his later classical commentaries. I shall discuss this possibility more closely 
in chapter 6, through a discussion of his concrete policy recommendations. Before doing so, 
however, I must first complete my survey of his position within the strategic debate. 
 
5.3 Barbarians and strategic discourse 
Throughout the preceding discussion, I have focused primarily on factors internal to the 
dynasty, most notably the aspect of domestic factional politics and its perceived effect on 
military preparation. So far I have neglected to address the primary external factor, namely 
the perceived barbarism of the hostile Jurchen, which further informed Zhu’s view. As noted 
in chapter 2, the Chunqiu-inspired worldview that distinguished between “cultured” center 
and “barbarian” periphery, coupled with his impression that barbarians were physiologically 
incapable of developing the human virtues, had motivated him to reject the possibility they 
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could ever be “subdued through softness” 以柔服.239 Due to their supposedly innate barbarian 
inferiority, the Jurchen were unlikely to participate properly in the social order of the tianxia. 
This fundamental premise influenced his position in two closely related ways: one pertaining 
to his opposition to the signing of peace treaties, the other informing his simultaneous 
opposition to an immediate offensive. 
Zhu reflected on the issue of Jurchen trustworthiness and their participation in peace 
treaties on several occasions throughout his life. One instructive example is his discussion of 
the events of 1123, when Song leadership had supposedly breached a peace agreement with 
the Jin by offering asylum to the fugitive Liao 遼 general Zhang Jue 張瑴 (d. 1123) who had 
rebelled against the Jurchen.
240
 Speaking to his disciples in the 1190s, he commented:  
 
Whenever his generals requested to raise troops to punish us, [Jurchen leader] Aguda 
refused, saying: “We have already settled our oath of alliance with the Song; how 
could we break it?” Even a barbarian was capable of maintaining trustworthiness and 
righteousness, while we broke the alliance and lost their trust, thereby incurring the 
anger of the barbarians! 其諸將欲請起兵問罪，阿骨打每不可，曰：「吾與大宋盟
誓已定，豈可敗盟！」夷狄猶能守信義，而吾之所以敗盟失信，取怒於夷狄之
類如此.241 
 
Peter K. Bol has recently interpreted this passage as an affirmation of a fundamental equality 
between barbarians and the Chinese, suggesting that Zhu Xi found them both equally capable 
of developing moral virtues like trustworthiness (xin 信 ). 242  This reading appears 
incompatible with my previous findings, namely that he found barbarians to be incapable of 
reliably expressing these moral virtues to their full extent. One may observe a parallel in 
Zhu’s 1198 claim that Jin ruler Shizong 金世宗 (r. 1161–1189) had reportedly achieved some 
semblance of benevolent government, sufficiently so to merit the generous nickname “Little 
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Yao and Shun” 小堯舜.243 However, he concluded that these attainments were superficial and 
incidental: “How could he change his barbarian ways? I fear he is just talented and 
approximated benevolent government by mere coincidence.” 他豈變夷狄之風。恐只是天資
高，偶合仁政耳.244 Similarly, it seems plausible that his main point was not to claim Aguda 
had displayed anything more than “coincidental” trustworthiness, but rather to emphasize by 
contrast the moral deficiency of Northern Song leadership at the time.
245
 That Chinese 
leadership could not maintain a moral standard “even a barbarian” 猶夷狄 had managed to 
approximate despite his inborn deficiency, was alarming indeed. 
Accordingly, Zhu Xi’s writings demonstrate a long-standing distrust of Jin 
participation in peace agreements. As early as 1162, he claimed in his first memorial to 
Xiaozong that the Jurchen barbarians would simply exploit the treaty as a cover for further 
military preparations, to be discarded once they found themselves fit to take the south.
246
 
Huang Kuanchong has suggested that this sentiment may have been widespread at the time, 
citing the Da Jin guozhi 大金國志 as stating that “Regarding the use of the military, the Great 
Jin solely used peace negotiations to aid their offensive efforts.” 大金用兵，惟以和議佐攻
戰.247 Regardless of their actual truthfulness, such claims resonate well with Zhu’s writings 
and appear to have informed his thoughts on the issue. In a letter addressed to his 
acquaintance Liu Pingfu 劉平甫, for example, he stated: “[Our] payments to the caitiff are 
extremely generous. I suspect that their strength has in fact dwindled, which is why they wish 
to delay our troops.” 虜人待遇甚厚，或疑虜勢實衰，故欲且緩我師耳.248 In his estimation, 
while the Jurchen had made it their strategy to use the peace treaty as a cover for further 
offensive preparations, partly sponsored by the Song treasury, Chinese leadership remained 
complacent and “found peace sufficiently dependable” 以和為可靠249 to maintain security. 
As such, Zhu Xi’s opposition to the signing of peace treaties was not only moral and 
institutional, as noted earlier, but also thoroughly strategic. 
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Lastly, while these observations cemented his opposition to peace, they 
simultaneously contributed to his rejection of an immediate offensive and ultimately 
strengthened his defensive and preparatory attitude. As noted previously, Zhu Xi was aware 
of reports that Jin leadership had attained increasingly stable and even benevolent standards of 
government.
250
 According to Yang Shao-yun’s recent interpretation of these statements, he 
had supposedly welcomed these reports as evidence that the Jurchen had lost their “barbaric 
military prowess” and became vulnerable to attack.251 However, a closer reading of related 
pronouncements instead indicates Zhu viewed these developments as matters of grave 
strategic concern. Responding to a question regarding Jurchen military power, he warned: “If 
they continue like this and no great stretches of brutal misrule [mark their reign], then it is to 
be feared that ultimately we will not be able to eliminate them.” 若是如此做將去，無大段殘
暴之事，恐卒消磨他未得.252 In other words, while (supposedly accidental) governmental 
success on the Jurchen side ultimately “failed to impress” Zhu Xi from a moral perspective,253 
he nevertheless considered it a distinct strategic threat. 
Unfortunately, Zhu did not elaborate further on these claims. One possible way of 
interpreting them is offered by Huang Kuanchong, who has recently demonstrated that 
relative stability under Jin Shizong had significantly decreased pro-Song activism and 
rebellion within Jin territory during the final decades of his life.
254
 As I observed in chapters 1 
and 2, Zhu noted throughout his classical commentaries that he considered relative moral 
decrepitude in the enemy a strategic advantage, as it would inspire the oppressed populace 
into spontaneous rebellion to support a morally superior invader. Besides the classic example 
of King Wu, whose inspiring presence had turned the subordinates of “wicked” King Zhòu 
against him, he furthermore noted that even Confucius himself considered rebellious 
insurrection among hostile forces a legitimate strategic asset in his case against Chen Heng of 
Qi.
255
 Conversely, such reasoning suggests that a relatively stable government could 
strengthen one’s military position by reducing internal unrest. Although Zhu Xi did not 
explicitly refer to these cases in his discussion of Jurchen governmental stability and its 
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implications for military reconquest, it is plausible that these considerations informed his 
demonstrable alarm over increasing Jurchen “benevolence”. 
In sum, the perceived barbarian nature of the Jurchen Jin informed Zhu Xi’s position 
within the debate in two closely related ways. Firstly, he cited the supposedly “barbarian” 
incapacity for moral development to argue against the signing of peace treaties with the 
Jurchen, doubting the extent to which they could be trusted to uphold their end of the 
agreement. Secondly, possibly inspired by classical examples of popular insurrection, he 
noted that Jin governmental stability, even if achieved only accidentally, had significantly 
strengthened its military position. 
 
Conclusion 
Contrary to what his particularly assertive style of moral argumentation has suggested to some, 
Zhu Xi appears to have been a virtually life-long proponent of the defensive (shou) position 
within the strategic debate. Even before the catastrophic 1163 counterattack against the 
Jurchen, he expressed his doubts regarding Song military readiness. Following twenty years 
of perceived military neglect, it is doubtful that he indeed viewed the early 1160s as “an 
opportunity for a quick victory”. This defensive position intensified in later years, as the 
perceived institutional impediments to reconquest persisted. Significant thematic parallels 
with the ideas expressed in his 1177 commentaries, particularly with regards to issues of 
military policy and preparation, suggest a high degree of interaction between his political and 
philosophical spheres of discourse. Ultimately, it appears that Zhu Xi’s experience with the 
concrete demands of warfare may have informed his strikingly “realist” approach to military 
topics within the Four Books. After all, “something has to be actually feasible for one to 
accomplish it.” In the following chapter, I shall turn to the concrete policies and measures Zhu 
proposed to accomplish his revanchist and irredentist goals. 
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6. Reforming the Song Military 
Despite the particularly assertive character of Zhu Xi’s moral case against peace, especially in 
the early stages of his political life, Zhu remained deeply concerned with several structural 
weaknesses that had crippled Song offensive capabilities. The aim of the current chapter is to 
examine these perceived weaknesses and assess the measures he proposed for military 
restoration. In the first section, I shall examine the philosophical and theoretical framework 
that structured his proposals. Addressing the recent claim that there existed a fundamental 
contrast between Zhu Xi’s plans for military restoration, grounded in seemingly esoteric 
notions of moral cultivation, and the results-oriented proposals of his more “utilitarian” 
colleagues, I will argue instead that concrete military reform served as an inextricable 
component of Zhu Xi’s brand of “moral rearmament”. In the second and third sections, I will 
apply these considerations to the individual policy suggestions that constituted his plan for 
restoration, touching on issues of military leadership, troop quality, and fiscal responsibility. 
 
6.1 Cultivating the “root”: moral regeneration and the military 
As one of the most central aspects within Zhu Xi’s thought, it is perhaps unsurprising that 
moral self-cultivation, aimed at the development of the chief virtues like benevolence and 
righteousness through the investigation of Principle, featured prominently throughout his 
policy recommendations. It is in this vein that Hoyt Tillman and Niu Pu have recently 
described Zhu Xi’s plan for restoration and recovery as a project of “moral rearmament” and 
“moral regeneration”, suggesting personal cultivation as the primary way of preparing for the 
eventual reconquest of the north.
256
 In this interpretation, Zhu Xi’s views contrasted strongly 
with those of his more practically-oriented contemporaries like Chen Liang and Ye Shi 葉適 
(1150–1223), conventionally termed “utilitarians”, who were indeed chiefly occupied with 
concrete military and institutional reforms as means of restoring Song capabilities.
257
 
However, Zhu Xi’s position within this supposed dichotomy has remained largely 
unelaborated. While it is noted that cultivation of the moral virtues would help fight 
corruption and facilitate government reform, it has remained unclear how these aims related 
concretely to the revanchist and irredentist effort.
258
 Furthermore, several specific military 
policies ascribed exclusively to the “utilitarians” by Tillman and Niu, such as the 
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decentralization of military responsibility and the revitalization of agricultural colonies, 
indeed featured extensively throughout Zhu Xi’s writings.259 To relate these initiatives to Zhu 
Xi’s moral and philosophical thought, I shall first reassess the function of moral self-
cultivation within the context of military affairs. 
One textual passage that is particularly suggestive of a preoccupation with moral 
cultivation is provided in the final section of his aforementioned 1163 memorial. Citing the 
example of King Xuan of the Zhou 周宣王 (r. 827–782 BCE) to summarize the classical ideal 
of military management, Zhu stated: 
 
When King Xuan inherited [the Way of Kings Wen and Wu], he restlessly cultivated 
his conduct, appointed the wise and employed the capable, cultivated state affairs 
internally, and repelled barbarians externally. Consequently, the Way of the Zhou 
flourished magnificently again. Looking at it from this perspective, we can understand 
the Way through which the former sage kings managed the barbarians: they did not 
take awe-inspiring might as the root, but virtuous and meritorious conduct; their 
appointments were not at the frontier, but at court; they did not see utility in weapons 
and food, but in guiding principles. 宣王承之，側身修行，任賢使能，內修政事，
外攘夷狄，而周道粲然復興。臣嘗以是觀之，然後知古先聖王所以制御夷狄之
道，其本不在乎威彊，而在乎德業； 其任不在乎邊境，而在乎朝延； 其具不在
乎兵食，而在乎紀綱.260 
 
For a proper understanding of this seemingly anti-militarist passage and its place within Zhu 
Xi’s broader scheme for military restoration, we must first examine its underlying theoretical 
assumptions. Most fundamentally, the structure of Zhu’s argument strongly reflects the 
sequential ordering between “root” (ben) and “tip” (mo) that would continue to characterize 
his political thought. As noted in chapter 1, Zhu Xi maintained that government policy 
unbound by moral considerations could not be sustainable: “Although the state is rich, its 
people will be poor; although the army is strong, its state will be defective.” 國雖富，其民必
貧；兵雖彊，其國必病.261 All policy was ideally informed by an investigation into Principle 
and the moral virtues. Accordingly, Zhu indeed emphasized in 1163 that the sage kings “did 
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not take awe-inspiring might as the root, but virtuous and meritorious conduct.” However, as I 
likewise noted in chapter 1, this process of moral cultivation constituted only the first half of 
the governmental process. When Principle determined that warfare was necessary, military 
action constituted the legitimate functional expression or “tip” inextricably tied to this 
particular “root”.262 It is in this vein that Zhu claimed, immediately following his statements 
on the exemplary ways of King Xuan in 1163, that the establishment of a moral foundation 
would serve precisely to facilitate “the Way through which the ancient sage kings 
‘strengthened the root and routed the enemy’ and ‘repressed the barbarians by might’.” 古先
聖王所以彊本折衝、威制夷狄之道.263 The particularly close relation Zhu Xi envisioned 
between “root” and “tip” meant that his seemingly esoteric call for “moral regeneration” was 
thoroughly practical in ultimate orientation, inextricably tied to concrete military policy.
264
 
One prominent target of Zhu Xi’s apparent call for moral regeneration appears to have 
been the aforementioned handful of supposedly pro-peace court favorites, whose perceived 
influence over military affairs he viewed as the root cause of Song military weakness.
265
 
Indeed, it is not coincidental that directly following his statements about King Xuan, Zhu 
continued by asserting that the “influence of flattering sycophants” 佞幸之勢266 constituted 
the most crucial issue facing the Song. As the foremost among the “guiding principles” 紀綱 
referred to by Zhu, reestablishing proper relations between lord and minister by “appointing 
the wise and employing the capable” and maintaining “virtuous and meritorious conduct” 
according to the classical ideal was essential to eliminating this institutional obstacle to 
military preparations.
267
 The apparent aim of Zhu Xi’s “moral regeneration” was precisely to 
create a political environment conducive to the preparatory policies hitherto impeded by the 
“talk of peace”.268 
As the court favorites retained their alleged authority over military affairs and the 
perceived fundamental cause of Song military dilapidation persisted, Zhu Xi continued to 
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emphasize moral regeneration as the “root” of his plan for restoration throughout subsequent 
decades.
269
 One important example of the perceived influence of the courtiers was their 
authority over all topmost military appointments throughout the 1170s and early 1180s, which 
had allegedly led to widespread bribery in the sale of military posts.
270
 I will discuss these and 
similar issues, relating to the “tip” of the restoration effort, in detail in the following section, 
touching on practical issues of military leadership, troop quality, and fiscal responsibility. 
 
6.2 Developing the “tip”: military reform 
Whereas Zhu Xi had indicated his concerns regarding perceived military weakness as early as 
1161, it was not until 1180 that he began to discuss particular issues and concrete solutions in 
a systematic fashion. He repeated a consistent list of problems, examined further below, on 
multiple occasions throughout subsequent decades.
271
 This initial period of increased attention 
to specific issues coincided with Zhu Xi’s brief assignment as prefect of Nankang Military 
District 南康軍 between 1179 and 1181, where he devoted attention to the material and fiscal 
issues that affected local military capabilities.
272
 Repeated reference to the situation in 
Nankang throughout his 1180 memorial suggests it may indeed have been this particular 
experience that alerted Zhu to the specific issues affecting the military and the fiscal pressure 
its upkeep exerted on the populace.
273
 Besides the issue of fiscal responsibility for military 
expenditures, to which I shall devote the next section, Zhu Xi focused on three main areas of 
concern. 
Firstly, Zhu was concerned over what he perceived to be a steep decline in the quality 
of military leadership.
274
 Due to rampant bribery in the sale of military posts by the “court 
favorites” surrounding the emperor, he argued, many officers and generals now lacked actual 
military experience and administrative bloat had increased significantly.
275
 Noting 
pessimistically that the average general occupied himself solely with metaphysical Principles, 
poetry, and fine calligraphy, Zhu concluded: “How does this improve anything?” 何益於
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事 .276  Furthermore, in order to recoup the costs of the substantial bribes involved, new 
generals allegedly turned to their subordinates as new sources of revenue; ultimately, the local 
populace bore the brunt of these extortionist practices.
277
 The chief solution was to wrest 
authority over the hiring of new military personnel from the select group of court confidantes 
and redistribute it to a wider selection of knowledgeable individuals at court. Actual combat 
experience, not ability to pay, should be the deciding qualification.
278
 
Secondly, Zhu alleged that as officers became increasingly incompetent, new recruits 
remained idle and no longer received adequate training. Efforts to remove old and weak 
soldiers from the ranks were frustrated, while new recruits were taken on indiscriminately. As 
a consequence, “The soldiers of the realm number four to five hundred thousand nowadays, 
yet these are all frail and useless men.” 今天下兵約四五十萬，又皆羸弱無用之人.279 Like 
his utilitarian-oriented colleagues Ye Shi and Chen Liang, Zhu argued that rising military 
expenditures had not resulted in a more reliable fighting force.
280
 As Zhou Chaxian has 
recently pointed out, Zhu repeatedly proposed to inspect the military records (junji 軍籍) and 
eliminate weak and underperforming personnel.
281
 Much more fundamental, however, was the 
perceived root cause of administrative incompetence, namely the supposed influence of the 
“court favorites” on all topmost military appointments. As such, “moral regeneration” aimed 
at the top-down rectification of the military apparatus remained Zhu’s priority. 
Thirdly, Zhu pointed to long-standing efforts at military centralization as a factor 
exacerbating these issues. He interpreted these efforts, initiated by dynastic founder Taizu 宋
太祖 (r. 960–976), as a response to the politically and militarily autonomous “buffer towns” 
(fanzhen 藩鎮) that had contributed to the downfall of the Tang 唐 (618–907). As noted in 
chapter 2, Zhu Xi considered centralized military authority the “absolute ideal according to 
the Principle of the matter” 事理之至當,282 to be maintained lest one invariably loses power 
altogether. Citing Analects 16:2 as he applied this stricture to the Tang precedent, Zhu noted: 
“The Master’s saying that ‘ritual, music, and punitive expeditions all stem from the Son of 
Heaven’ explains the situation [of the fanzhen] exceedingly clearly.” 夫子說禮樂征伐自天子
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出一段，這箇說得極分曉.283 However, while Taizu’s initiative was therefore fundamentally 
commendable, the process suffered from its own success as local defensiveness, especially on 
the frontier, decreased accordingly. Emphasizing the importance of moderation in such 
policies, Zhu noted to his disciples after 1191:  
 
Looking back at [the mistakes of] the preceding Five Dynasties, our own dynasty took 
all the military power away from the buffer towns, together with all of their discretion 
over rewards, punishments, and policy. However, our prefectures and counties 
subsequently became weak and frail, so that all of them were defeated by the [Jurchen] 
bandits during the Jingkang disaster [of 1127]. This was indeed caused by a failure to 
observe the proper measure. 本朝監五代，藩鎮兵也收了，賞罰刑政，一切都收了。
然州郡一齊困弱，靖康之禍，寇盜所過，莫不潰散，亦是失斟酌所致.284 
 
One crucial way of restoring the “proper measure” was to revivify the system of agricultural 
colonies (tuntian 屯田) and task the frontier prefectures with the training of farmer-soldiers 
(minbing 民兵), ideally attaining fiscal self-sufficiency through agricultural activities.285 In 
the first analysis, this idea may appear at odds with the repeated insistence on military 
centralization. I shall address this issue more closely in the following section on fiscal reform. 
for my present purposes it suffices to note that Zhu Xi stressed the necessity of delegating 
military maintenance to the prefectures, not unlike his utility-minded colleagues.
286
 
Historically, Song founder Taizu had bolstered his efforts at centralization by 
maintaining a system of regular troop rotations (gengshu 更戍) between capital and frontier. 
The aim of this system was twofold: firstly, it was meant to break personal bonds between 
commanders and their subordinates; secondly, it was to provide the capital-based Imperial 
Army (jinjun 禁軍) with regular training opportunities as it toured the frontier.287 Although 
Zhu Xi referred regularly to these “methods of Taizu” 太祖法  as an important way of 
restoring the Song military, his chief concern lay primarily with the second, not the first, 
purported aim of the system: “Today’s soldiers are useless. […] It would be fitting to disperse 
the metropolitan armies and train the soldiers in the counties, rotating them north across the 
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Huai each year to guard the border, in accordance with the methods of Taizu.” 今日兵不濟事 
[…] 宜散京師之兵，卻練諸郡之兵，依太祖法，每年更戍趲去淮上衛邊.288 Furthermore, 
contrary to what was originally the primary aim of the system, Zhu Xi emphasized the need to 
acquaint generals more closely with their subordinates as well as local strategic dispositions, 
despite the possibility that vested interests could take hold.
289
 
To Zhu Xi, these statements did not contradict his simultaneous insistence on the 
centralization of military authority in the hands of the emperor. He noted to his students that 
although Taizu’s armies had been dispersed throughout the prefectures, “they were all called 
‘Imperial Armies’ and remained at the disposal of the Son of Heaven; no other levies [of 
troops] were allowed.” 謂之禁軍者，乃天子所用之軍，不許他役.290 What had brought 
down the late Tang, according to Zhu, was that all local institutional power, both military as 
well as civilian, had been monopolized completely into the hands of individual military 
commissioners (jiedushi 節度使 ). 291  As such, the issue was not necessarily that some 
discretion over military matters had been delegated to local actors, but rather that this 
authority was no longer balanced out institutionally by other officials. This institutional 
counterbalancing, Zhu appears to have argued, would ideally ensure the Son of Heaven 
retained his final say on military affairs. 
In sum, Zhu Xi’s goal was to achieve the “proper measure” between Tang 
decentralization and the perceived over-centralization of the Song. One of the methods meant 
to achieve this balance, namely the regular rotation of troops and generals, would 
simultaneously serve to address perceived shortcomings in the quality of soldiers as well as 
their commanding officers. Ultimately, however, Zhu Xi insisted that the primary cause of the 
perceived decrease in Song military capabilities was deeply institutional, tracing it to the court 
favorites who wielded the authority over all topmost military appointments. “Moral 
regeneration” aimed at the top-down rectification of the military apparatus remained Zhu’s 
fundamental priority. In the following section, I will extend these considerations to his 
thought on fiscal reform. 
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6.3 Tuntian and fiscal reform 
Following dynastic founder Taizu’s decision to relieve local governments of their 
responsibility to train and maintain armies, partly out of fear these could potentially be used in 
future uprisings, central government spending on the military increased substantially.
292
 In 
Zhu Xi’s own estimation, military spending claimed between eighty and ninety percent of the 
entire state budget, a figure similarly repeated by his utilitarian-minded colleagues.
293
 Part of 
the problem was that, although the dynasty had lost a significant share of its territory to the 
Jurchen in 1127, it had not re-proportioned expenditures accordingly: “Although nowadays 
our tax income does not equal that of our ancestors, we maintain more troops than they ever 
did; how could we not be in these dire straits?” 今以不如祖宗時財賦，養祖宗時所無之兵，
安得不窮也.294 As Zhu observed personally during his tenure as prefect in Nankang Military 
District, this system had burdened the agrarian populace with an increasingly unbearable 
fiscal pressure.
295
 
The proposed solution was to partially decentralize responsibility for the maintenance 
of the army and defer it back to the prefectures.
296
 As early as 1165, Zhu indicated in a letter 
to Wang Shuai 汪帥 that he sought to revitalize the system of agricultural colonies, tasking 
the frontier prefectures with the training of self-sufficient farmer-soldiers.
297
 The currently 
dominant system, in which peasant farmers labored for the upkeep of soldiers who themselves 
supposedly “sat around idly while eating their fill” 飽食安坐, was inefficient as it left an 
important source of labor untapped.
298
 As one of the few contexts in which Zhu still 
envisioned a feasible role for the Mencian well-field system (jingtian 井田), he suggested that 
such colonies should divide their fields into nine smaller plots and dedicate the harvest of the 
middle plot to the maintenance of the colony’s military staff.299 While the system would 
primarily serve to decrease army expenditures by the central government, thereby lowering 
the tax burden and easing the strain on grain transport infrastructure, it would simultaneously 
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increase the amount of soldiers that could sustainably be maintained along the frontier. As an 
essential element in his strategy for restoration, Zhu Xi proposed the tuntian system to 
Xiaozong in virtually all of his policy-oriented memorials following 1180.
300
  
Although Zhu Xi discussed the tuntian system predominantly in terms of its fiscal 
merits, several statements suggest he simultaneously considered it a vehicle for military 
training, preparation, and, perhaps most importantly, border defense. Speaking to his disciples 
in the 1190s, he noted: “If we have [the prefectures] train soldiers, manufacture armaments, 
and construct ramparts in order to defend one area, then wouldn’t this amount to covert yet 
formidable preparations?” 若使之練習士卒，修治器甲，築固城壘，以為一方之守，豈不
隱然有備而可畏.301 While Huang Kuanchong has rightfully pointed out that the type of local 
militarization proposed by Zhu benefited efforts at increasing domestic security, Zhu Xi’s 
writings instead indicate he conceptualized the system primarily in terms of external security 
and border defensiveness.
302
 This approach is observable as early as 1165, when Zhu Xi 
argued to Wang Shuai that agricultural colonies were crucial to prepare for the supposedly 
inevitable breakdown of peace agreements with the Jurchen, established earlier that year.
303
 
Fifteen years later, summarizing his proposal for military reform to Xiaozong, Zhu similarly 
placed the tuntian system and its farmer-soldiers firmly within his strategy for national 
defense:  
 
It is my humble opinion that only by carefully selecting military officials and 
reexamining the military records, we can economize on military expenses; [only] by 
expanding the agricultural colonies can we make military reserves plentiful; [only] by 
training farmer-soldiers can we improve our border defenses. 竊意惟有選將吏、覈兵
籍，可以節軍貲；開廣屯田，可以實軍儲；練習民兵，可以益邊備.304 
 
However, Zhu Xi’s interest in tuntian was not without several strong reservations. In a 1171 
letter to Zhang Jingfu, he noted that previous attempts at reinstating the system had failed as 
certain “dissolute swindlers” 欺誕者 had abused it for personal gain and misstated its aims.305 
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Possibly indicating that this had become a common argument against the system in its entirety, 
Zhu Xi argued in his 1180 address to Xiaozong that although certain “dissolute and deceptive 
petty persons” 誕謾小人 had caused previous attempts at revitalizing tuntian to fail, this was 
not a necessary outcome of the system itself.
306
 As with other issues, Zhu Xi traced the root of 
this problem to those individuals at court who supposedly wielded great authority over 
military appointments and thereby exerted significant influence over the direction of military 
reform. The rapid decrease in the quality of commanding staff caused by this alleged abuse of 
power jeopardized the functioning of the entire system, as the officers tasked with its local 
supervision were no longer adequately qualified.
307
 While it would theoretically be possible to 
remedy this somewhat by appointing additional civil officials to directly oversee colony 
management, Zhu noted to Xiaozong in 1180, the entire point of the system was precisely that 
it would allow the military to become financially self-sustaining without such costly 
governmental intervention.
308
  
As such, while Zhu considered tuntian vital to continued fiscal survival of the military 
and, by extension, the dynasty itself, the success of any such initiative depended wholly on 
the quality of its military leadership. As long as institutional authority over all topmost 
military appointments remained in the hands of the supposed “court favorites”, possibly the 
very same “deceptive petty persons” Zhu accused of sabotaging previous attempts at 
reinstating the system, the most crucial item in Zhu Xi’s plan for restoration remained to be 
his particularly results-oriented brand of “moral regeneration”.  
 
Conclusion 
Despite its esoteric appearance, Zhu Xi’s call for “moral rearmament” was directly and 
inextricably related to concrete military reform. Reflecting the sequential relationship between 
“root” and “tip” that he would later use to describe the governmental process in his 1189 
commentaries, Zhu indicated in 1163 and beyond that his brand of “moral regeneration” was 
ultimately meant to attain practical results. His foremost priority was to remove the perceived 
institutional impediments to military restoration, namely the handful of court favorites who 
had allegedly monopolized authority over all topmost military appointments. Once this 
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impediment was removed and the quality of military leadership was restored, commanding 
staff could once more be trusted to train their troops properly and reliably implement the 
tuntian program of agricultural colonies to ensure the long-term fiscal survival of the military 
and the state. Military over-centralization should be counteracted to improve local military 
capabilities, ideally attaining the “proper measure” without giving way to the notorious buffer 
towns of Tang precedent. In this light, Zhu Xi’s policy proposals demonstrate distinct 
parallels with those of his utilitarian-oriented contemporaries. 
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Conclusion 
The aim of the present thesis was to examine Zhu Xi’s thought on military affairs and assess 
its reflection in his writings and recorded sayings, including both his philosophical works and 
his statements on concrete contemporaneous issues. A closer examination of this body of 
work has indicated the existence of a complex and multidirectional relationship between these 
spheres of discourse, suggesting one may attribute to Zhu Xi a coherent strand of military 
thought, formed over several decades through the influence of his concurrent experiences as 
both an active participant in Song strategic debate and as a prominent member of the 
intellectual community of the “Learning of the Way”. 
The theoretical framework that came to inform Zhu Xi’s thought on the formulation 
and execution of military policy reflected several key characteristics of his broader view on 
government practice. At the foundation of this framework lay the notion of Principle, as the 
normative determinant of all things “as they should be”, the investigation of which was the 
most fundamental priority of any individual intent on governing. Due to the inextricable yet 
sequential nature of the relation Zhu Xi envisioned between this “root” of the governmental 
process and its accompanying functional expression or “tip”, he maintained that a proper 
understanding of normative Principle should serve to inform and guide all military policy and 
action. At least in his own understanding, this distinguished his approach from that of the 
bingjia, whose alleged inversion of the root-tip hierarchy had “awakened in the ruler a heart 
that was willing to exhaust his troops in wanton acts of aggression.” 啟人君窮兵黷武之心.309 
Conversely, as long as it was guided by an understanding of Principle, warfare was not 
necessarily reprehensible or even problematic. The particularly close conceptual relationship 
Zhu consistently evoked between military policy and other practical implements of 
government, like legal punishment and regulatory decree, suggests he accepted them equally 
as legitimate governmental concerns, readily translatable into real and practical government 
policy. The implications of this conceptual pairing for Zhu Xi’s thought on legal affairs 
represent a promising avenue for further research into his legal and political thought. 
Simultaneously, Zhu Xi recognized that certain violations of Principle not only 
allowed but indeed mandated military intervention, aimed at maintaining social and political 
order both domestically within the Chinese cultural sphere of the “Central Lands” as well as 
in relation to the perceived barbarian elements inhabiting its outer periphery. Functioning 
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complimentarily to the transformative force of the sovereign’s moral virtue when this 
peaceful influence proved insufficient to accomplish the task, Zhu Xi eventually came to 
conceptualize such recourses to punitive warfare as inevitable, “expedient” responses to acute 
historical circumstance. At the foundation of this thoroughly historicized approach to warfare 
lay Zhu Xi’s partially immanental conceptualization of universal Principle. Instead of viewing 
moral virtue and its transformative influence as a panacea to solve all conflict, Zhu 
maintained instead that the complex interactions between myriad historical entities 
occasionally resulted in situations that could only be adequately addressed through armed 
intervention. While such actions may be at variance with the prevalent moral standard, they 
ultimately “complied with the Way” 反經合道 and indeed Principle itself.310 Challenging the 
recent claim that it was incorrect for Zhu Xi to apply his particular conception of the 
“expedient” (quan) to issues of war, I would instead suggest that the topics of warfare and 
military policy present a promising avenue for further inquiry into the Confucian intersection 
between individual morality and the forces of history. 
One of the earliest and indeed most prominent reflections of this approach can be 
observed as early as 1162, decades before its formalization as a theoretical principle in Zhu 
Xi’s interlinear commentaries, in his first public case for war against the “the enemies of our 
sovereign and our fathers”. Urging the recently enthroned Xiaozong to “respond to the 
endless changes of the age” 應當世無窮之變,311 Zhu Xi appealed to the primacy of Principle 
itself to argue that the Jurchen had to be expelled from the “Central Lands” by force. 
Challenging the recently held suggestion that he eventually abandoned this cause later in life, 
I demonstrated in chapter 4 that by reconceptualizing the sovereign and the enduring dynasty 
itself as the primary foci of revanchist sentiment, Zhu in fact maintained both the revanchist 
and irredentist causes as the Southern Song’s “grand essence” 大體 with unabated fervor to 
the end of his life.
312
 The close similarity between this real, contemporaneous case for war 
and his later comments on classical cases of war as they featured in his commentaries on the 
Confucian classics, authored throughout subsequent decades, suggest that his political 
advocacy of war against the Jurchen Jin may have exerted a substantial influence on the way 
Zhu would continue to approach the legitimacy of warfare as an issue of scholarly interest. 
As some wars were necessary, so was the need to adequately prepare for them. As 
early as 1161, Zhu Xi indicated that, based on his perception of the Song military as both 
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materially and institutionally derelict, an immediate offensive against the Jurchen was 
unfeasible. Subsequent memorials submitted shortly after Wanyan Liang’s abortive incursion 
furthermore suggest that this defensive and preparatory attitude persisted and indeed 
strengthened substantially throughout and beyond the 1160s, despite the particularly assertive 
style of moral argumentation Zhu employed against advocates of the peace treaty. These 
observations challenge the recently held view that Zhu supposedly maintained a “hawkish” 
support for an immediate counterattack. More fundamentally, they corroborate the argument 
that Zhu Xi’s approach to warfare was deeply sensitive to the demands of historical, societal, 
and strategic circumstance. One instructive reflection of this practically-oriented approach is 
Zhu Xi’s admission that even Confucius himself may have entertained strategic 
considerations in his case against Chen Heng of Qi, eventually concluding that “something 
has to be actually feasible for one to accomplish it.” 事也須是可行方得.313 Coupled with the 
observation that Zhu Xi’s public advocacy for the defensive (shou) position within the debate 
coincided with the formative period of his commentaries on the Confucian Four Books, these 
findings suggest a strongly intertwined process of conceptual development, ultimately 
constituting a consistently realist and nuanced view on matters of warfare. 
Lastly, this nuanced approach manifested itself throughout Zhu Xi’s targeted analyses 
of Song military dilapidation, presented on multiple occasions to the Emperor himself. 
Reflecting the sequential relationship between “root” and “tip” that informed his broader view 
on the governmental process, Zhu Xi insisted that moral cultivation played a foundational role 
within his plan for Song military restoration. However, offering a substantial corrective to 
recent approaches to the topic, I have demonstrated that these calls for “moral rearmament” 
were consistently targeted at a very particular impediment to Song restoration, namely the 
perceived influence of several court favorites who had allegedly usurped the authority over all 
topmost military appointments at court. Once this issue was rectified, Zhu argued, the quality 
of commanding staff could be restored and the proper training of soldiers could be resumed. 
To ensure the fiscal sustainability of the military, particularly along the northern frontier, Zhu 
Xi proposed to revitalize the tuntian system of military agricultural colonies. These measures 
furthermore served to counteract a long-standing tendency towards increasing military 
centralization which, starting from Song founder Taizu, had wrought havoc on local military 
capabilities. Several points of distinct resemblance between Zhu Xi’s proposals and those of 
his supposedly more “utilitarian” contemporaries suggest that despite its initially esoteric 
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appearance, Zhu Xi’s plan for restoration was in fact thoroughly practical in its ultimate 
orientation. Unfortunately, due to space constraints I have only been able to provide a cursory 
description of Zhu Xi’s policy proposals and identify several similarities they shared with 
those of his contemporaries. A more thorough comparative analysis of these proposals based 
on my findings may prove to be a fruitful point of departure for further inquiry into the 
strategic debate at the Southern Song court. 
In sum, I have delineated the primary characteristics that constituted Zhu Xi’s strand 
of military thought. Sensitive to the demands of history, society, and strategy, this strand of 
thought left its traces through all spheres of discourse, manifested in Zhu Xi’s commentaries 
on the classics, his personal letters to close friends and powerholders at court, and indeed in 
the political memorials he submitted to the Emperor himself. Integrating a utility-oriented 
concern for the practical demands of the moment with his broader moral and cosmological 
philosophy, Zhu Xi ultimately developed a multi-faceted yet coherent strand of military 
discourse. 
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